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Due to their complexity and variability, placebo effects remain controversial. We suggest
this is also due to a set of problematic assumptions (dualism, reductionism, individualism,
passivity). We critically assess current explanations and empirical evidence and propose
an alternative theoretical framework—the enactive approach to life and mind—based
on recent developments in embodied cognitive science. We review core enactive
concepts such as autonomy, agency, and sense-making. Following these ideas, we
propose a move from binary distinctions (e.g., conscious vs. non-conscious) to the
more workable categories of reflective and pre-reflective activity. We introduce an
ontology of individuation, following the work of Gilbert Simondon, that allow us to
see placebo interventions not as originating causal chains, but as modulators and
triggers in the regulation of tensions between ongoing embodied and interpersonal
processes. We describe these interrelated processes involving looping effects through
three intertwined dimensions of embodiment: organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective.
Finally, we defend the need to investigate therapeutic interactions in terms of participatory
sense-making, going beyond the identification of individual social traits (e.g., empathy,
trust) that contribute to placebo effects. We discuss resonances and differences between
the enactive proposal, popular explanations such as expectations and conditioning, and
other approaches based onmeaning responses and phenomenological/ecological ideas.
Keywords: enaction, embodiment, meaning response, agency, participatory sense-making, Gilbert Simondon,
placebo & nocebo effects
INTRODUCTION
Placebo effects have been and continue to be a source of controversy. There are disagreements
about how to define them (Thompson et al., 2009; Moerman, 2013; Howick, 2017) and
even doubts about their existence (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche, 2001, 2004). A significant
body of evidence shows that robust and consistent bodily responses can follow medical
interventions and that these responses are not caused directly by those specific interventions.
They cannot be explained away by the natural evolution of the condition, regression to the
mean, reporting bias, or observer effects. These responses depend on non-specific or incidental
factors. They happen in a variety of conditions—e.g., pain, depression, anxiety, Parkinson’s disease,
sensorimotor limitations, addictions and behavioral disorders, immune and endocrine conditions,
somatoform disorders—according to both subjective and objective measures. They follow different
procedures—e.g., administration of pills, injections, ointments, technological interventions such
as Deep Brain Stimulation in Parkinson’s Disease or transcranial magnetic stimulation in other
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conditions, surgery, hypnosis, or through the therapeutic
relationship itself. They occur both in clinical settings as
well as in healthy subjects (Finniss et al., 2010; Ashar
et al., 2017; Jensen, 2018). Controversies concerning placebo
phenomena arise in part from the fact that these are
group rather than individual effects. When looking at a
particular patient, placebo effects are unpredictable and hard
to reproduce. From being considered a confound to be
eliminated, understanding placebo effects has become an
important challenge for clinicians (Evers et al., 2018) and a source
of ethical concern (Alfano, 2015; Hardman et al., 2019).
It is generally accepted that placebo interventions exert
psychosocial rather than direct physiological influences on
patients. Explanations are diverse but they all attempt to bridge
a gap between psychology and physiology, looking at how both
kinds of processes combine through the effects of expectations
(e.g., Atlas and Wager, 2012), conditioning, and other forms
of learning (e.g., Montgomery and Kirsch, 1997; Colloca and
Benedetti, 2009), meaning responses (e.g., Moerman and Jonas,
2002), rituals (e.g., Kaptchuk, 2011), emotional modulations (e.g.,
Price et al., 2008), and interpersonal factors (e.g., Kaptchuk et al.,
2008). These explanations are not mutually exclusive.
Despite this variety, several assumptions seem to be
commonly accepted when carrying out empirical studies and
framing explanations of placebo. For instance, assumptions about
the relationship between psychology and physiology, between
lived experience and health, between active and passive roles
in the patient-practitioner encounter, and between social and
individual factors. In questioning traditional assumptions, some
authors have directed their attention to the roles of embodied
personal and social experience (Frenkel, 2008; Thompson et al.,
2009; Ongaro and Ward, 2017). Inspired by these ideas and
following recent advances in embodied cognitive science, our
main objective is to articulate an interpretation of placebo
phenomena based on the enactive approach to life and mind
(Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; McGann et al., 2013;
Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014; Di Paolo et al., 2017, 2018;
Fuchs, 2017; Gallagher, 2017), and examine the purchase enactive
concepts may have for approaching placebo effects from a
non-dualistic point of view. This perspective is promising and
deserves to be introduced to the scientific community working
on placebo research precisely because it overcomes traditional
explanatory gaps between physiological, psychological, and
social processes.
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we provide a brief
overview of popular explanations of placebo effects and their
associated assumptions. Then, we offer a general description of
the enactive approach, linking key enactive ideas with existing
explanations on placebo. We provide a detailed description
of the enactive concept of dimensions of embodiment:
organic/physiological, sensorimotor/psychological, and
intersubjective/social. Following the philosophy of individuation
developed by Simondon (2020), we extend the explanation of
enacted bodies to include concepts of tension, metastability,
preindividuality, and individuation. These concepts allow us
to develop our relational-processual interpretation of placebo
phenomena. Once our view of bodies and placebo effects is
presented, we examine the sensorimotor/psychological and the
intersubjective realms, investigating how they can influence the
physiological dimension. We focus on sensorimotor agency,
introducing the dynamic interplay between pre-reflective and
reflective activity to replace the limiting dichotomic distinction
between conscious and non-conscious processes. Then, we
address the intersubjective domain by studying the concept of
participatory sense-making in the context of the therapeutic
encounter and other interactions. After describing how the
physiological, the sensorimotor, and the intersubjective realms
interact in placebo phenomena, we present some remarks on
enactive conceptions of health. In the next section, we summarize
our contributions to placebo research and offer suggestions to
investigate enactive ideas empirically. Finally, we compare
our approach with other explanations of placebo, discuss the
limitations of our work and possible future developments,




The most widespread account of placebo effects involves
expectations, that is, a purely psychological construct that
mediates between intervention and placebo effects (Kirsch,
1985, 1997, 2018). Positive expectations toward the intervention
are postulated as causes for the positive effect of a placebo
treatment. Expectations are not unitary entities. Kirsch separates
stimulus and response expectancies. Stimulus expectancy is
defined as the anticipation of external events that can alter
perception (e.g., of painful stimuli), and response expectancy
corresponds to predictions of non-volitional bodily responses.
Expectations usually involve a combination of diverse processes
involving the interaction between brain, body, and environment.
Response expectancies tend to be “stronger, more stable, and
more resistant to extinction” (Kirsch, 2018, p. 83), and also
more relevant to explain placebo effects, as they are self-
confirming. Although stimulus and response expectancies can be
experimentally disentangled (Schenk et al., 2017), they usually
overlap. Expectations have also been distinguished according to
the level of reflectivity involved (Geers et al., 2019). Explanations
based on expectations have received renewed interest within the
popular framework of predictive processing and the free energy
principle (Büchel et al., 2014; Ongaro and Kaptchuk, 2019).
According to this framework, deviations from expectations
update an internal model of the world that generates predictions
about future interactions and events. By predicting bodily
responses, expectations are hypothesized to elicit and modulate
perceptions and induce changes through top-down mechanisms
(Geuter et al., 2017).
Expectations, however, do not lead to individual placebo
effects in a reliable manner. This could be because diverse
psychological processes can also contribute to placebo
phenomena: e.g., non-conscious goals and motivational factors
(Geers et al., 2005), personality traits (Corsi and Colloca, 2017),
hopes (Eaves et al., 2016), attention, emotional modulations,
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symptom attribution, anticipation (Geers and Miller, 2014;
Horing et al., 2014).
Some experiments are better accounted for by conditioning
rather than expectations, that is, a learning procedure that by
pairing initially ineffective stimuli with effective ones, makes
the former elicit “specific” responses associated with the latter
(e.g., Benedetti et al., 1999). According to this view, previous
experiences with clinicians, institutions (e.g., hospitals), or with
certain treatments could be responsible for placebo effects.
Both conscious and non-conscious learning procedures can
induce or modulate bodily responses. Some researchers rely
on non-conscious (implicit) expectations (e.g., Geers et al.,
2019) to explain placebo effects elicited by purely non-conscious
procedures (Jensen et al., 2012, 2015; Babel et al., 2017). The
problem is that if conscious expectations are already highly
fluctuating (e.g., Eaves et al., 2015) and difficult to grasp, measure,
andmanipulate, appealing to nonconscious expectationsmay not
offer any additional verifiable explanatory power. Conditioning
and expectations are not mutually exclusive (e.g., Stewart-
Williams and Podd, 2004; Jensen, 2018) and several proposals
combine them (e.g., Kirsch et al., 2016; Zion and Crum, 2018).
Zion and Crum (2018) expand the notion of expectations to
that of “mindsets,” integrating implicit learning mechanisms.
They assume additivity among different factors and linear
hierarchical influences from the social to the psychological to
the physiological, but neglect feedback mechanisms across these
levels and multiple scales (e.g., van Orden et al., 2003; Anderson
et al., 2012).
To extract the underlying assumptions behind these
explanations, it helps to remind ourselves of how placebo effects
tend to be defined in empirical contexts.
In biomedicine, the use of placebos plays a key role in
the evaluation of efficacy through randomized control trials
(RCTs). Placebo effects have been interpreted negatively as
“outcomes that cannot be measured in RCTs” (Sullivan, 1993,
p. 224; Frenkel, 2008). Although this does not imply that
they are an artifact of this methodology, the widespread
view on placebo effects and placebo research tends to be
linked to the theoretical and methodological assumptions
of RCTs. Paterson and Dieppe (2005) point out three of
these assumptions. First, the diagnosis is performed before
the intervention and it is kept constant throughout the
trial. In this way, the dynamic nature of the subject’s
response is limited and complex interventions that demand
short-term adaptations, like physiotherapy, acupuncture, or
psychotherapies, are difficult to assess using RCTs. Second,
incidental or non-specific factors are generic and not linked
to any particular therapeutic theory. However, what is non-
specific in one intervention, as the therapeutic relationship
in a drug trial, may be specific in another (e.g., psychiatry).
Many studies lack an appropriate methodology to tell apart
specific and non-specific effects, hindering replicability (Peper
and Harvey, 2017). For instance, the psychological changes
associated with the “real” treatment could contribute to believing
the treatment is working (evenwhen it does not). Active placebos,
interventions that mimic the bodily sensations of the “real”
treatment (without its specific effects), have been proposed to
control for this situation (Boot et al., 2013). Third, specific
and non-specific factors are assumed distinct and additive. In
artificial and controlled experimental conditions, and for short-
term timescales, physiological and psychological variables may
be sufficiently disentangled (Benedetti et al., 2019). However,
the apparent independence of physiological and psychological
variables cannot be easily generalized from these cases to longer
timescales. Linear additivity among different factors therefore
can be acceptable in particular experimental settings (Benedetti
et al., 2019), but not in general (Kleijnen et al., 1994; Coleshill
et al., 2018). The tendency to study isolated variables looking for
linear causes, while useful in particular cases, is not sufficient to
fully comprehend complex phenomena across scales.
In addition to the assumptions identified by Paterson and
Dieppe (2005), we can point to other common assumptions
in RCTs. The separation between specific (physiological) and
non-specific (non-physiological) factors implies a dualistic
stance (Kirmayer, 1988). In RCTs, the specific is the physical and
measurable. The uncontrollable other (i.e., psychological, social,
and contextual factors) is labeled as non-specific. A dualistic
split is assumed between the object body and the lived body.
The object body is the measurable physical body that biomedical
methods can access to define diseases objectively. The lived body,
in contrast, is related to subjective experience, to illness, and
demands a first-person perspective to grasp it. The biomedical
paradigm is centered on understanding physical bodies and
treating diseases. The necessity to rely on subjective measures
(e.g., in pain or depression) is interpreted as a methodological
weakness, as in reporting bias (Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche,
2004); something best avoided. The patient becomes an object
to be known by the practitioner, the knower. As a consequence,
there is a tendency to treat patients—in RCTs, placebo research,
and in biomedicine in general—as passive machine-like bodies
responding to treatments in lawful ways. Agency, the sense of
agency, and the capacity to generate and alter personal narratives
are therefore downplayed, even when it is known that they
affect experience, behavior, and bodily responses (Kirmayer
and Gómez-Carrillo, 2019). Furthermore, in line with the
individualist tendency of the biomedical paradigm, the socio-
cultural environment is assumed to be an external influence
playing at most a contextual, modulatory role (although of
increasingly acknowledged importance, see e.g., Wager and
Atlas, 2015). All of these separations emerge from adopting
a dualistic stance that ignores or downplays the underlying
relations between the contrasting elements (specific/non-
specific, physiology/psychology, physical body/lived body,
knower/known, individual/sociocultural). They affect RCTs
and placebo research in general. For instance, expectations
are considered as mental representations separate from non-
volitional bodily responses but somehow able to affect them.
Dualism also underlies the dichotomy between conscious and
non-conscious processes in explanations in terms of expectations
and conditioning.
To summarize, the assumptions behind many explanations of
placebo are (1) reductionism and linearity, the attempt to isolate
variables and posit linear causal links, (2) dualism as revealed by
the separation between specific and non-specific factors, between
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objective and subjective measures, and between physiology and
psychology, (3) the relegation of lived experience to a secondary
explanatory role, (4) a tendency to remediate dualism with
representationalism i.e., conceiving cognition as themanipulation
of mental representations mediating between the separable
processes of perception and action, (5) the passivity of individuals
undergoing procedures and the neglect of their agency, (6) an
excessive individualism that assigns a mere contextual secondary
role to participatory and sociocultural processes, and (7) the
limited temporality of experiments that downplay the complex
dynamic and historical nature of living bodies.
Given that these assumptions work more pervasively by
not being out in the open—despite having been repeatedly
criticized—it is not surprising that placebo effects remain such
a source of controversy. These assumptions may be acceptable in
pharmaceutical trials, but the limitations they impose on placebo
explanations cannot be overlooked.
THE ENACTIVE APPROACH: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW
In this section, we briefly overview some basic enactive ideas and
in the sections that follow, we focus on specific concepts that we
deem of particular relevance for placebo research: dimensions of
embodiment, agency, and participatory sense-making. This will
enable our goal of evaluating what these ideas—as developed in
the enactive approach—can contribute to placebo research.
The enactive perspective is an active strand in embodied
cognitive science, part of what is known as the 4E approaches:
embodied, embedded, extended, enactive (Newen et al., 2018)1.
It offers a naturalistic approach to life and mind (Varela et al.,
1991; Thompson, 2007; McGann et al., 2013; Di Paolo et al., 2017,
2018; Fuchs, 2017; Gallagher, 2017). The enactive approach is
strongly influenced by phenomenology, pragmatism, dynamical
systems theory, and organizational approaches in biology. One
of its central premises is that of a continuity between life and
mind that accepts the relative qualitative distinctions of different
kinds of biological and mental phenomena while at the same
time stressing their deep connections in a non-reductionist
manner (Thompson, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2017). A central
enactive concept is that of autonomy (Varela, 1979; Di Paolo,
2005; Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014). Autonomy is a technical
and operationally defined concept at the root of the enactive
approach (that should not be confused with more general uses
of the term). Autonomous systems, such as organisms, are
defined in systemic terms as operationally closed and precarious
networks of mutually enabling processes. They are materially
self-constituting (self-producing and self-distinguishing). At
the same time, they require active engagements with the
external enabling relations on which they depend. A living
unicellular organism is a paradigmatic example of autonomy
(in this case, autopoiesis). It is a self-individuating material
entity that emerges from a continuous and precarious process
1There are different versions of E-approaches, sometimes adding the ecological or
the emotional dimensions to the list of Es (e.g., Stilwell and Harman, 2019).
of self-production (of its organizational integrity) and self-
distinction (from its environment). Its complex metabolic
pathways, many of which are auto-catalytic, produce and
repair a semipermeable membrane, which in turn contains
and enables the metabolic reactions instantiating a network of
operationally closed processes. Autonomous systems can exist
at various scales, from metabolism and immune activity to
nervous, sensorimotor, and social dynamics. And these multi-
scale autonomous processes can influence, constrain, and enable
each other in complex ways.
The material individuation of an organism is simultaneously
the emergence and specification of an (organism-relative)
environment, which arises, formally and materially, with a
myriad of possibilities for meaningful interactions (Varela, 1997;
Weber and Varela, 2002). Autonomy provides organisms with
a perspective on the world, according to which events are
meaningful insofar as they affect the continuation of their
precarious processes of self-individuation. These meaningful
relations are not ascribed externally but correspond to the
organism itself. To operationalize this idea, enactivists speak of
adaptivity (Di Paolo, 2005), a system-theoretical concept that
allows us to explain how the organism can follow its vital
norms (Thompson, 2007) by telling apart dangerous from safe
situations, e.g., nutrient-poor from nutrient-rich environments.
Sense-making, then, is defined as “the capacity of an autonomous
system to adaptively regulate its operation and its relation with
the environment depending on the virtual consequences for its
own viability as a form of life” (Di Paolo et al., 2018, p. 33). This
is a general concept that describes the structure of all mental
phenomena, including their cognitive and affective aspects. It
expresses the deep relation between the continued existence of an
agent and its concrete situation as a relation of being attuned to,
or caring for, what matters. The combination of sense-making,
precarious autonomy, and adaptivity leads to a non-dualistic
naturalization of the core aspects of the mind and underlies
every process of perception, action, emotion, and cognition.
They all share a basic existential/experiential structure of concern
or caring. Based on these concepts, enactivists propose three
requirements that are necessary for an organism to be considered
an agent. (1) self-individuation: agents must actively differentiate
themselves from their surroundings. (2) interactional asymmetry:
agents must be capable of altering their coupling with the
environment (not only being affected by it). (3) normativity:
agents must follow the norms that emerge from their form of life
(even if they can incorporate external norms). Agency marks the
difference between an event that simply occurs and an act that
is performed.
ENACTIVE IDEAS AND EXISTING
EXPLANATIONS OF PLACEBO
Before we proceed to elaborate more specific potential
contributions from the enactive approach to placebo
research, we should mention that, broadly, enactive
ideas already resonate with ecological, phenomenological,
meaning- and person-centered explanations of placebo
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phenomena. These already existing parallels are worth a brief
mention here.
The concepts of agency and sense-making resonate with
meaning-response accounts of placebo phenomena (Moerman
and Jonas, 2002; Goli, 2016). According to this viewpoint, it is
not placebos as such that cause placebo effects. The stimulating
effect of red-colored “inert” pills and the tranquilizing effect
of blue ones are a direct consequence of the meaning they
generate. Meaning responses explain why placebo effects are
more pronounced with more invasive procedures (Meissner
et al., 2013), the influence of awareness of a treatment (e.g.,
Colloca et al., 2004), and the need for active placebos (Boot
et al., 2013) to control for meaning responses to bodily sensations
following “real” interventions. Ameaning response does not refer
only to conscious semantic meaning (Kirmayer, 2003; Thompson
et al., 2009). It is important not to interpret the meaning as
another representationalist mediator linking the inner and the
outer world (Taylor, 2006), but as a series of processes that can
be triggered or modified by a placebo intervention. This is in
agreement with the enactive understanding of meaning as the
activity of a fully embodied autonomous agent, i.e., sense-making,
rather than something “in the head.”
The enactive approach also resonates with
phenomenological/ecological perspectives on placebo. Frenkel
(2008) draws inspiration from the concept of affordances in
ecological psychology, that is, the possibilities for action that
the environment presents to the agent (e.g., a doorknob affords
being turned to open a door). Frenkel proposes to move from
meaning responses to affordances of healing, which he defines
as solicitations of the environment that allow improving a
health condition. They are procedures that allow responses that
improve a particular situation. However, an affordance does not
entail a response. A door that affords opening remains closed
until someone acts on it. The action may even fail. Placebo
interventions open a possibility for a response but do not
actualize it. Moreover, this possibility is not given to conscious
or reflective responses only but can include pre-reflective and/or
non-conscious activity. In other words, sense-making applies to
the whole active organism concerning its environment. Meaning
hence is tightly linked to agency, embodied experience, history,
and situation.
Ongaro and Ward (2017) also emphasize the role of
affordances, which they link to a shift in attention from the
figure (environment) to background (body) in pain or illness.
While agreeing with this interpretation, we will elaborate a
perspective in terms of the interplay between pre-reflective and
reflective activity that includes attentional modulations but also
habits, readiness, emotional dispositions, and action tendencies
(see section “The Interplay between Reflective and Pre-Reflective
Activity”). Ongaro andWard (2017) also highlight the benefits of
placebo research of adopting an enactive perspective because it
is inherently affective and intersubjective. Emotions, in this view,
are not private states but involve the whole embedded organism.
Affectivity arises in meaningful relations with the environment
and as dynamical configurations of bodily activity (Colombetti,
2014). Human sense-making is transversed by personal habits,
social practices, language, and cultural narratives. If culture,
cognition, and affectivity are part of interrelated systems, it
should not surprise us to observe bodily responses following
culturally meaningful events. Our goal is to expand on Ongaro
and Ward’s (2017) proposal, articulating and deploying enactive
tools to further investigate the “web of dynamic relations between
mind, body, and world, between affect and cognition, and
between self and society” (ibid. p. 530).
In the following sections, we elaborate on this brief overview
of enactive concepts by articulating the relations between
dimensions of embodiment, reflective and pre-reflective aspects
of agency, and participatory sense-making. We acknowledge the
crucial role that the affective (Colombetti, 2014), the experiential
and the existential (de Haan, 2020) dimensions play in the
enactive approach and their relevance for placebo phenomena.
While we touch on some of these aspects, due to space
constraints, we will not elaborate on them in the present work.
LIVING AND ENACTED BODIES
In this and the following sections, we expand and elaborate on
some enactive concepts to offer more specific tools for building
explanations of placebo effects.
Human bodies enact similar (though not identical) processes
of autonomy, sense-making, and agency simultaneously, giving
rise to the organic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective dimensions
of embodied self-regulation (Thompson and Varela, 2001).
The organic dimension is characterized by metabolism,
immune and hormonal regulation systems, and other
physiological processes. The sensorimotor dimension
corresponds to self-induced neural activity as well as perception-
action loops, which are organized in plastic and dynamic
networks of interrelated behavioral patterns or sensorimotor
schemes (Di Paolo et al., 2017). As these schemes organize
themselves into networks of structural and functional relations,
the resulting sensorimotor repertoire (skills, powers, sensitivities)
can also meet the requirements for agency (self-individuation,
interactional asymmetry, and normativity). Sensorimotor agency
is another form of autonomy, different from, but entwined
with organic autonomy. Habits are an example of self-sustained
sensorimotor relational patterns that ground a set of norms
underdetermined by purely organic normativity (as shown by
the difficulties in changing “bad” habits that negatively affect
organic processes, e.g., addictions, Ramírez-Vizcaya and Froese,
2019). Finally, the intersubjective dimension describes the
circular processes of generating and transforming meaning and
constituting personhood through social interactions, language,
and social norms.
It is important to note that each dimension can include
several interrelated cycles or loops (Kirmayer and Gómez-
Carrillo, 2019), which makes them more challenging to study
than linear causal chains, but not impossible. Furthermore, the
three dimensions are interdependent, dynamically intertwined in
a non-hierarchical way constituting a precarious, autonomous,
self-individuating, but often also self-contradictory human body
(Figure 1). The interplay between these dimensions makes
it hard to separate causes and effects. Stilwell and Harman
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FIGURE 1 | Dimensions of embodiment. Left: the organic (red), sensorimotor (blue), and intersubjective (green) dimensions of embodiment are composed of cycles or
loops (circles), interrelated in a non-hierarchical way and deeply influencing each other (arrowed lines between circles). The regulation of each dimension occurs under
precarious conditions, that is, in interaction with the environment that can enable, facilitate or constrain internal constitutive processes (lines directed outwards or
toward a loop). Right: a disorder in an organic loop (broken red cycle), e.g., arterial disease, can limit sensorimotor capacities (reduced blue circle). A disruption in the
organic cycle can begin to be compensated by the sensorimotor dimension (walking therapy), which is supported by the intersubjective loop (interaction with trainers).
(2019) discuss the limitations of splitting a non-decomposable
phenomenon such as pain into biological, psychological, and
social components. The interactions are not additive and, as a
consequence, each dimension cannot be investigated in isolation
(Di Paolo et al., 2018, ch. 5). Consider patients with arterial
disease in the lower limbs undergoing walking therapy. Vascular
obstruction reduces blood flow, generating pain and limiting
walking capacity. “Walking therapy does not intervene in vessels.
Yet it may lead to clinical improvement; that is, it may increase
a patient’s pain-free walking distance.” (Mol, 2002, p. 226). There
is no single disease in the arteries, but an embodied experience
of pain and practical limitations, that make walking therapy
an appropriate treatment. Moreover, the attitude of the trainer
deeply influences the process. The intersubjective dimension is
fundamental for the sensorimotor activity to have a positive effect
on a problem of organic origin. In turn, increasing pain-free
walking distance also enhances the activity and social life, and
alters personal narratives that impact future social behavior—
another looping effect.
What is the role of the brain in this picture? The enactive
approach moves away from neurocentric perspectives. Through
enactive lenses, “the brain is conceived as a plastic system of
open loops that are formed in the process of life and closed to
full functional cycles in every interaction with the environment”
(Fuchs, 2011, p. 196), a “mediating organ” that despite playing
a crucial role in the meaningful interactions between body and
environment, does not give rise to lived experience all by itself
(Thompson and Cosmelli, 2011); despite contributing to mental
processes, it does not create the mind; despite being crucial for
reasoning, perceiving, and feeling, it does not think, perceive,
or feel by itself. It is the whole body in interaction with its
environment that does all of these things, and not any part of
it. The enactive approach avoids mereological fallacies typically
encountered in neuroscience (Bennett and Hacker, 2003).
Several perspectives on brain function are largely compatible
with these enactive ideas (e.g., Kelso, 1995; Freeman, 2000;
Varela et al., 2001; Anderson, 2010; Pessoa, 2013; Tognoli and
Kelso, 2014; Raja, 2018). Cognition, then, is what happens in the
coupling between the bodies of agents and their environment
(and the affectivity that emerges in this engagement), and not
what happens inside their heads. Perception and action are
not two independently accessible processes dealing with inputs
and outputs, respectively, but codependent facets of closed
sensorimotor loops. They give rise to the sense of agency, a sense
of being situated in a meaningful world.
A RELATIONAL-PROCESSUAL
CONCEPTION OF PLACEBO EFFECTS
To better understand the enactive dimensions of embodiment,
we introduce in this section some key ideas of Gilbert
Simondon’s (2020) philosophy of individuation2. This will
contribute to formulating a relational-processual interpretation
of placebo phenomena.
Over the last decade, Simondon’s work has become
increasingly influential on the development of enactive ideas
(e.g., Stewart, 2010; Thompson, 2011; Di Paolo et al., 2018;
Dereclenne, 2019; Di Paolo, 2020). In particular, Simondon’s
2For reasons of space, we barely touch on some fundamental aspects of Simondon’s
philosophy of individuation. For introductions to his work, see Chabot (2013) and
Scott (2014).
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philosophy of individuation complements enactive concepts
such as autonomy, agency, and sense-making by explicating the
material and relational conditions that underlie different kinds
of individuation, from physical to social. Simondon advances
an ontology of becoming that puts the ongoing processes
of individuation in a place of priority over the fully formed
individual. This helps clarify thematerial conditions under which
biological and cognitive “individuals” are inescapably subject
to multiple tensions across different modes of individuation.
Rather than being fully formed once and for all, the regulation
and transformation of these tensions make up a body’s
ongoing becoming. In this way, Simondon’s philosophy
helps us make better sense of the different dimensions of
embodiment by escaping the age-old dualism of matter and form
(hylomorphism) that is prevalent in most current approaches in
biology and psychology, including organizational theories of life
such as the classical theory of autopoiesis (see DiFrisco, 2014; Di
Paolo, 2018).
The entwinement and circularities within and between
the dimensions of embodiment make tensions and conflict
ubiquitous phenomena. Acknowledging this fact can lead to
a major switch in how we approach placebo phenomena. By
tension, in this context, we specifically mean the state of a
system or process being subject to multiple regulatory demands
simultaneously. There are tensions between sympathetic and
parasympathetic nervous activity, between insulin and glucagon
in glycemic regulation, and so on. An excess or a lack can lead
to disease, and eventually, be fatal. Tensions also emerge in
the sensorimotor dimension (e.g., between flexor and extensor
muscles, between multiple affordances and intentions) and in the
intersubjective one (e.g., between being oneself and submitting
to the demands of an interactive encounter). And also between
dimensions of embodiment through conflicting normativities,
as in habits and addictions. From the enactive perspective,
life is not a harmonious process where all the different parts
necessarily cooperate for the common good, but the result
of generating, releasing, and transforming tensions between
processes, under the ever-present possibility of breakdown
and death.
The work of Simondon (2020) provides tools to make sense
of these different kinds of tension. He offers a processual
ontology for understanding entities (including living organisms)
as resulting from ongoing processes of individuation rather
than as finished, ontologically complete beings. Without going
into too much detail, the paradigmatic example of physical
individuation is the formation of a crystal in an oversaturated
solution. A perturbation (e.g., a seed) to the metastable liquid
solution triggers a phase transition, releasing part of the chemical
potential and leading to another (lower energy) metastable
state. The perturbation is not responsible for crystallization,
it is a trigger. The oversaturation of the solution and the
tensions and potentialities it generates (what Simondon calls
the preindividual) are essential for the perturbation to have any
effect. We cannot understand the process of individuation just
by examining the trigger. This idea, together with the notion of
the preindividual, have sometimes been implied but never made
explicit in previous enactive work.
In contrast with physical individuation that releases tension
in one go when triggered by external stimuli, vital individuation
involves an ongoing process of regenerating tension. Simondon
understands living organisms as self-organized entities that
actively renew tensions to keep themselves far from equilibrium
(i.e., death), opening up new potentialities and becoming
a source for future individuation processes. When tensions
cannot be managed through organic processes alone, they
can be regulated by the interdependent psychic and collective
forms of individuation. Psychic individuation is related to the
sensorimotor dimension of embodiment. Psychic individuation
regulates tensions between internal and external processes and
between individuated structures and preindividual potentialities
(i.e., past and future) that give rise to affective states. It does so
through processes described as actions, perceptions, emotions,
memories, thoughts, and so on. Perception integrates different
sensations, perhaps confusing or conflictive, into a meaningful
whole, like the disparity between the two-dimensional images
in each retina that is solved by individuating a perception of
depth. Likewise, emotion makes different affects compatible
along multiple axes (e.g., pain/pleasure, curiosity/boredom,
risk/safety, hunger/satiety) to organize action. Simondon argues
not only in favor of the continuity between life and mind
but also between individuals and society. Psychic individuation
requires participation in the collective. This does not mean
that uninterrupted social interactions are necessary to carry out
psychic individuation (e.g., to generate instances of perception
and emotion), but that those processes depend on previous
interactions and collective individuation (e.g., developing in
a given socioeconomic condition, learning a certain language,
acquiring a particular habitus). Through shared practices, social
groups continuously generate collective individuations, such as
institutions, values, prejudices, morals, science, art, and so on.
What this view suggests is that a placebo intervention should
be understood as a perturbation that modifies the configuration
of existing tensions and that may or may not trigger an
individuation process. Placebo effects, then, are individuation
processes in a configuration of pre-existing tensions that, in
analogy with the case of crystallization, amplify local effects,
transducing between micro- and macro-scales, between somatic
and psychic activity, and induce new coherences through the
propagation of internal resonances. Placebo effects are bodily
responses that “solve” a certain problem or blockage and release
or regulate accumulated tensions. But not all interventions
trigger an individuation process leading to a placebo response.
These responses depend on how the intervention triggers
processes of sense-making and how they contribute to personal
meaning. And this depends on a person’s experiences and current
context understood not just as static situational states (e.g.,
beliefs, expectations), but as ongoing processes of individuation.
Such individuation processes are not exclusive of placebo
interventions. They can be triggered, facilitated, or curtailed
by therapeutic encounters and other meaningful interactions.
They can contribute to a healing process (placebo) or trigger
a cascade of processes that increase other tensions, leading to
diverse symptoms, and hindering well-being (nocebo). Or they
can fail to trigger any significant change at all.
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With this conception of placebo, in the following sections, we
explore how sensorimotor and intersubjective dimensions can
affect the physiological dimension describing and applying the
enactive concepts of agency and participatory sense-making.
AGENCY
There is a tendency in placebo research to treat patients’ bodies
as passive, neglecting the role of the patient’s agency. However,
active patient involvement in decisions about treatment leads
to more pronounced placebo effects (Geers et al., 2013). The
effects of an intervention are often measured according to the
evolution of isolated symptoms. By contrast, we argue that
symptoms must be framed within the lived experience of the
individual, her current practices, and her sociocultural context.
Symptoms manifest the active nature of the body, as they
result from attempts at regulating existing tensions. A patient’s
history, motivations, worries, habits, and current actions are not
incidental or merely contextual factors in placebo phenomena.
In the case of patients with arterial disease mentioned earlier
(Mol, 2002), pain-free walking distance is one measurable
variable that contributes to (but does not determine) lifestyle
limitations. Importantly, the success of walking therapy is not
established by the state of the arteries. Factors like effort,
motivation, worries, expectations, hopes, and the relationship
with the trainer or therapist are relevant as well (Stilwell and
Harman, 2017; Kinney et al., 2020).
Interestingly, trainers tend to hide their role in the
effectiveness of walking therapy. “[T]he idea that the results
of walking therapy are one’s own achievement is a boost
for a patient’s self-confidence.” (Mol, 2002, p. 230). So, not
only does agency as such matter (see also Collins et al.,
2010), the sense of agency and perceived self-efficacy also
play a key role in therapeutic settings (O’Leary, 1985). From
an enactive perspective, studies manipulating perceived self-
efficacy in therapeutic settings are continuous with placebo
phenomena (Bootzin and Caspi, 2002; Thompson et al.,
2009), because they involve bodily responses following concrete
interventions that cannot be explained by the interventions
themselves. They are related to misattributed action outcomes
(i.e., altered perceived self-efficacy) instead of misattributed (or
amplified) bodily sensations as in typical placebo responses
(e.g., Weinberg et al., 1984).
As we have discussed, human bodies are not given, already
individuated entities from which actions emerge but are co-
defined and co-constituted by what they do in the world.
Consequently, well-being is a result of the activity and
situatedness of embodied agents. Breakdowns in well-being
correspond to breakdowns in our possibilities as agents. In the
phenomenological literature, pain and illness are interpreted
as breakdowns interrupting activity and directing attention
toward the body (Toombs, 1988; Colombetti, 2011). Similarly,
modulating attention can contribute to placebo effects (Geers
et al., 2006), by altering behavioral patterns, or displaying
environmental affordances that facilitate healing (Frenkel, 2008;
Ongaro and Ward, 2017). From this viewpoint, any intervention
altering the perception of the environment (Trimmer et al.,
2013, p. 13) will affect placebo phenomena. But it does so by
impacting the network of interrelated behavioral patterns that
constitute sensorimotor agency (Di Paolo et al., 2017). Therefore,
one of the goals of placebo research, we suggest, should be
to unveil the connections between meaningful interventions
and sensorimotor repertoires—involving attention, habits, and
everyday practices—, taking into account that they are not
fixed, but plastic, dynamic, and sensitive to experience and
social interactions.
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN REFLECTIVE
AND PRE-REFLECTIVE ACTIVITY
An obstacle to revealing the role played by agency in placebo
phenomena lies in the fact that sensorimotor schemes are
not always overtly activated but can still influence action,
perception, and emotion (Dewey, 1922/1988). Habits, attitudes,
and trait concepts (e.g., “being old”) can elicit behavioral
changes (Hacking, 1999). The situation is usually dichotomized
into conscious and non-conscious influences, a simplification
that favors attention on conscious processes while consigning
non-conscious processes to an empirically inaccessible shadow,
a hidden variable open to unbridled speculation. We have
already mentioned some of the limitations of the conscious/non-
conscious divide. It is also dichotomous, leaving little room
for theorizing about the relation between the two terms. It is
methodologically problematic as non-conscious processes are
often lumped together with non-intentional activity and any
other factor whose influence is difficult to articulate. For this
reason, it risks generating confusion and leads to problematic
constructs, such as “non-conscious expectations” or, by contrast,
focusing too much on only the conscious aspects of a meaning
response. To overcome these limitations we consider the
dynamic interplay between the pre-reflective and reflective sense
of agency.
The difference between the pre-reflective and the
reflective experiences of agency (Gallagher, 2012) follows
the phenomenological distinction between pre-reflective and
reflective forms of experience (Legrand, 2007; Gallagher and
Zahavi, 2013). Both are forms of embodied intentionality.
Briefly, the reflective aspect of the sense of agency is transitive
(i.e., involving a subject-object distinction), explicit, and
phenomenologically dominant, while the pre-reflective aspect
is intransitive, often implicit, and phenomenologically recessive
(i.e. noticeable when the flow of our actions is disrupted).
Many approaches in placebo research focus on the reflective,
communicable aspects of experience. However, in everyday
actions (e.g., opening a door), in habitual activity (e.g., riding
a bicycle), or during skillful absorbed coping (e.g., dancing)
reflective activity is not always required and may be completely
absent (and in some cases detrimental). These situations display
pre-reflective aspects of the sense of agency. The reflective
aspect is manifested in avowed volition, control, and intention.
By contrast, actions that defy reflective intentions, such as
crying in public unwillingly, phobic reactions to harmless
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situations, or addictions, emerge pre-reflectively. The lack of
alignment between explicit intention and action is a consequence
of conflicting norms and affectivities, tensions that remain
unsolved. Voluntary (reflective) processes are not always
able to avoid, delay, or control the accumulation of tension.
These complex phenomena are usually collapsed into the
binary distinction between willful/accidental, with important
consequences for how we assign blame and social responsibility
(Kirmayer and Gómez-Carrillo, 2019).
The distinction between reflective and pre-reflective
intentionality offers more flexibility than dichotomies such
as wilful/accidental or conscious/non-conscious. Pre-reflective
activity is not hidden or inaccessible, nor are its manifestations in
conflict or contradiction with the presence of reflective activity.
The relation between these concepts is not so much one of
logical opposition, but more like that of figure and background;
complex and asymmetrical. Unlike reflective activity, which
may withdraw in absorbed coping, pre-reflective activity never
completely stops. A mathematician solving an abstract problem
is a paradigmatic example of reflective activity, employing
symbolic representations, and reasoning. But these processes are
enabled by pre-reflective bodily intentionality, from intuitions
and habits to adjusting the working environment to fit the task.
Moreover, if at some point she stops working (reflectively) on the
problem, pre-reflective processes may continue in the shadow,
and sometimes, trigger intuitive insights. In contrast, an expert
dancer that completely silences reflectivity during practice, or
an expert rock-climber facing a well-known wall, are examples
where pre-reflective activity dominates. Agency gets immersed
in pre-reflective processes. However, absorption in an activity
(in the absence of reflectivity) does not mean losing control
over one’s actions. There is an embodied intentionality at play.
There are acts, dispositions, forms of bodily responsiveness,
“intentional arcs” such as adjusting the body’s relation to the
world to attain maximal grip (Merleau-Ponty, 2012) that are not
directed by conscious or explicit goals (Dreyfus, 2002; Custers
and Aarts, 2010). Although these activities are dominated by
pre-reflective processes, reflective activity may reappear and
contribute to these performances. A rock climber will take a
pause and consider the wall rising in front of her before moving
again in absorbed “mode.” Reflective processes are very present
at the initial stages of learning a skill and diminish with increased
expertise (Dreyfus, 2002).
Expectation explanations of placebo effects rely primarily on
consciousmental activity or non-conscious processes performing
reflective-like functions (e.g., inference, prediction). The pre-
reflective dimension is hardly considered. In contrast, Frenkel
(2008) suggests that placebo effects can be explained exclusively
by pre-reflective activity, that is, involving only non-conceptual
motor intentionality. His position finds support in studies
that show no modulation of placebo effects with cognitive
tasks (Buhle et al., 2012). However, there are studies showing
modulation of placebo effects with cognitive abilities as well,
at least according to some measures. Individuals with higher
IQs or with less severe symptoms in populations suffering from
Alzheimer’s show more pronounced placebo effects (Benedetti
et al., 2006; Curie et al., 2015). So while we must bring in
pre-reflective processes into placebo explanations, we cannot do
away with reflectivity altogether.
The need to avoid dichotomies is implicitly recognized
by some researchers. For instance, Geers et al. (2019, p.
212) distinguish between “low-thought” and “high-thought”
expectations “(‘I believe the pill will reduce my pain just because
a doctor said it’ vs. ‘I believe it because a doctor made me
actively think about the compelling arguments presented’)” not
as binary categories, but as distributed along a continuum. This
proposal considers different levels of reflectivity, but still neglects
pre-reflective activity. As “high-thought” expectations are more
robust and durable, predict better placebo effects, and are more
likely to affect behavior than “low-thought” expectations, the
authors suggest that increasing the level of reflectivity is likely
to facilitate placebo effects. However, excessive expectations
can lead to disappointment, despair, and harmful responses
when things do not evolve as expected. The active and diverse
phenomena of hopes (Eaves et al., 2016), often difficult to
disentangle from expectations (but not reducible to them), may
play a balancing role to get partial benefits of expectations while
minimizing risks (Kaptchuk, 2018).
In other situations, excessive reflectivity can lead to worries
and anxiety, generating tension, seizing attention and resources,
and curtailing pre-reflective processes. Placebo phenomena have
been associated with the activation of self-healing mechanisms
(e.g., Walach and Jonas, 2004), the modulation of the immune
response (e.g., Evans, 2005; Pacheco-López et al., 2006), and
reduction of anxiety (Petrovic et al., 2005). We propose that
tension release (diminishing harmful reflective activity) and the
modulation of pre-reflective activity, such as the (re)activation
of previously blocked processes, are likely to underpin global
effects such as the ones mentioned above—an interpretation
compatible with affordances of healing (Frenkel, 2008) and with
opportunities to “reprioritize tasks” in environments perceived as
safer (Trimmer et al., 2013). In contrast to the passive picture,
the patient is always already flowing in a set of physiological,
cognitive, affective, and interactive engagements. These activities
make a difference.
To see the explanatory possibilities afforded by the category
of pre-reflective intentionality, consider that placebo analgesia
might improve therapeutic outcome by altering the range and
variety of movements performed involving the injured area,
through bodily adjustments and accommodations, changes in
attention, or interpretation of bodily sensations. These are
processes akin to regenerating habits, adopting new bodily
postures, and a different awareness of bodily possibilities and
sensitivities. Fostering activity in pain situations is common
in physiotherapy. We have already mentioned that walking
therapy in cases of arterial disease increases pain-free walking
distance (Mol, 2002), but it also enhances social life and personal
narratives pre-reflectively (as a by-product not reflectively linked
to the original pain nor to the explicit goal of the therapy),
which, in turn, may lead to renewed bodily confidence and
positive looping effect on the success of the therapy.We would be
surprised if placebo interventions did not have a significant effect
on pre-reflective bodily processes, but these are not systematically
studied in this context.
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The shift from the relatively static dichotomy between
conscious/non-conscious states to a more nuanced, and dynamic
distinction between reflective and pre-reflective activity provides
a tool for moving from a mechanistic, relatively passive view
with the patient receiving and responding to treatment, to a
more relational and active conception. Accordingly, we can
conjecture that placebo interventions do not by themselves
cause placebo effects, but rather trigger them by intervening in
the existing configuration of entwined active processes in the
current situation of the agent. This proposal can account for
the variability, non-specificity, and unpredictability of placebo
effects. The explanatory burden is shifted from the placebo
intervention as such to the relational context of processes that
are already active and which a variety of different interventions
could trigger, modulate, or perturb to similar effect.
Such a shift toward a more active relational perspective on
forms of bodily intentionality may require novel experimental
paradigms to assess the impact of placebo interventions on
personal and social practices, habits, and other behavioral
patterns. For instance, a relatively recent experimental paradigm
that can be explained in terms of the dynamics of reflective
and pre-reflective processes is that of open-label placebos (OLP;
Kaptchuk et al., 2010), as we shall discuss in the next section.
Patients are reflectively aware of the fact they are taking a placebo.
But they are still encouraged to undergo the whole ritual of the
intervention, which, as it progresses, must still be accommodated
in a bodily fashion, and these socially induced pre-reflective
adjustments may lead to improvements in a variety of conditions
(Charlesworth et al., 2017).
THE THERAPEUTIC ENCOUNTER AS
PARTICIPATORY SENSE-MAKING
There is evidence to suggest that a strong and positive therapeutic
relationship improves therapeutic outcomes in diverse fields,
from physiotherapy (Kinney et al., 2020) to psychiatry (Martin
et al., 2000). Similarly, an empathic interaction with a competent
therapist tends to elicit placebo effects (Kaptchuk et al.,
2008; Howe et al., 2017). At the same time, harmful nocebo
responses can arise from unsympathetic, perfunctory therapeutic
encounters (e.g., Benedetti et al., 2007). Any diagnostic act
involves a social encounter that has the potential to influence
the therapeutic outcome (Kirmayer, 1994), both reflectively and
pre-reflectively. Understanding why can benefit clinical practice.
In their lived experiences, the patient and the clinician
or therapist approach the meaning of illness from different
perspectives. The patient might be confronted with the body as
an object, even as an alien object that generates bodily doubt
(Carel, 2013). However, the body-as-object that she perceives is
qualitatively different from the body-as-object perceived by the
clinician (Toombs, 1987). Too often, the role of the clinician
is reduced to extracting a known disease from the complex
illness experience of the patient, sometimes attending only to
the patient’s body while neglecting or downplaying the patient’s
agency and experience. But, there is a lived experience that must
be taken into account for this encounter to be successful. The
patient is often suffering, with high doses of uncertainty and
worry, and seeking help, meaning, and change. By contrast, the
practitioner is supposed to have knowledge and skills, although
she also needs to deal with uncertainty, time constraints, and
expectations (from the patient and the institution) that generate
pressures to act. These two separate positions might facilitate
a passive role in the patient and an active paternalistic one in
the practitioner. From an enactive viewpoint, these tendencies
must be overcome for successful participatory interaction to fully
develop (see De Jaegher, 2019). Meaning from these two distinct
positions must find some common ground to develop a shared
world that fosters healing (Toombs, 1987).
The outcome of a therapeutic encounter depends on what
enactivists call participatory sense-making. Participatory sense-
making occurs when a social encounter develops its autonomous
dynamics while preserving the autonomy of the participants (De
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007; De Jaegher, 2018). That interaction
dynamics can take a life of their own is illustrated by the simple
example of two people walking in opposite directions in a narrow
corridor, who find themselves locked in a temporary dance of
symmetric sideway movements in their attempt to move past
each other. They remain in interaction thanks to their efforts
to get out of it. Participants in a social interaction undergo
phases of coordination at multiple levels, from synchronization
of neural and other physiological variables such as heart rate to
joint action and perception to the regulation of interpersonal
distance, turn-taking, conversational tone and topic, gestures,
and so on (e.g., Dale et al., 2013). Meaning is jointly created
by navigating situations of coordination and recovery from
coordination breakdowns. Individual sense-making, i.e., the
way each participant regulates intentions, perceptions, actions,
emotions, etc. is literally modulated, sometimes enabled, and
even co-constituted, by the sense-making of other participants
and by the dynamics of the interactive encounter (De Jaegher
et al., 2010); hence participatory sense-making. This means that
other participants are not merely sources of imperfect social
information to be complemented by individual inferential or
simulation processes. Both individual and interactive autonomies
are key for this process to occur.
Participatory sense-making is less likely to occur when rigid
or orchestrated patterns curtail participation. Crucially, this
process does not reduce to individual skills, intentions, or
actions, even though it depends on them. It depends also on the
concrete dynamics of the interactive encounter. Being sensitive
to both patient and practitioner, there is a third interactive
element not entirely controlled by either. Paternalistic attitudes
by practitioners not only hinder patients’ autonomy but are
also an obstacle to the autonomy of the interaction. At the
same time, pressure and attempts to control the situation by
patients can also produce breakdowns that negatively affect
therapeutic outcomes. Most studies in placebo research focus on
individual subjective states in patients—e.g., personality traits,
motivational goals (Geers et al., 2005; Corsi and Colloca, 2017)—
or practitioners—e.g., empathy, competence (Kaptchuk et al.,
2008; Howe et al., 2017)—and their attitudes and beliefs (Darlow
et al., 2012). The interaction process as such has not been
sufficiently investigated.
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Evidence, however, suggests that interactive elements play an
important role in placebo phenomena beyond the states or skills
of individual participants. Kelley et al. (2009, p. 793) compared
interactive patterns under augmented (warm and empathic)
encounters eliciting larger placebo effects and limited (neutral)
therapeutic relationships in acupuncture treatments of patients
with Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS). The results revealed
a large difference when participation is allowed to emerge
in the augmented condition: the practitioner “facilitat[ing]
patient’s speech,” not “being distant, aloof (vs. responsive
and affectively involved),” or allowing space for improvisation
by not “exert[ing] control over the interaction.” Fostering
shared meaning seems important as well: paying attention to
patients’ experience, treatment goals, or “current or recent
life situation,” or the therapist providing explanations while
avoiding “a teacher-like (didactic) manner.” As a result, patients
showed less resistance to “examining thoughts, reactions, or
motivations related to problems” in the augmented condition.
These factors are evidence that a patient’s genuine participation
is encouraged. Interestingly, this study found that patient
extraversion, agreeableness, and openness influenced placebo
effects, but only in the augmented condition, suggesting that
interactive factors can sometimes override the effect of positive
social traits. This may explain the lack of consistent results when
looking for placebo responders. Individual factors would seem to
be relevant in that they can enable a rich process of participatory
sense-making, but participation as such may still be thwarted for
other reasons beyond the control of the participants.
Kelley et al. (2009) also found variability in therapeutic
outcome even among therapists following the very same protocol
(see also Johns et al., 2019). A protocol must be enacted; its
basic description does not capture speech tones, body language,
atmospheres, moods, receptivity, or prejudices. Performance
matters (Thompson et al., 2009; Myers, 2010; Czerniak et al.,
2016; Chen et al., 2019). Interactive elements can be shaped,
but not entirely controlled. If they were, then participation,
by definition, would be absent or very poor. Indeed, implicit
influences are ubiquitous in social interactions (Greenwald and
Lai, 2020), and they lead to double-blind procedures in RCTs.
As blinding techniques attempt to remove the impact of these
implicit interactive elements, it makes sense that RCTs cannot
measure their influence on therapeutic outcomes.
Open-label placebos (OLP; Kaptchuk et al., 2010;
Charlesworth et al., 2017) are a good example of the relevance
of participatory sense-making in therapeutic encounters.
Participants in these interventions must overcome the “non-
sense” of taking a substance they know to lack any physiological
effect. Uncertainty emerges and shared meaning must be
generated from scratch (even against pre-existing knowledge).
The active and purposeful performance of the practitioner
facilitates this process by allowing the autonomy of the
interaction to develop in a certain direction. Meaning is shaped
by including strict instructions as in “real” treatments (e.g.,
“taking the placebo pills for 21 days is important,” Hoenemeyer
et al., 2018, p. 3), by fostering an “open mind” toward possible
unknown processes, by talking about a “novel mind-body
treatment” (Carvalho et al., 2016, p. 2767), or by explaining the
powerful influences of placebo effects, conditioning, attitudes,
and faith on a treatment (Kaptchuk et al., 2010). When there
is no such rationale, placebo effects are significantly reduced
(Locher et al., 2017). In addition to the rationale, we suggest that
interactive elements play a key role as well. Through participatory
sense-making, tension is generated between existing beliefs and
the proposed treatment. This tension opens up potentialities for
change, increasing opportunities for individuation processes to
be triggered. Uncertainty—together with imagination (Hardman
and Ongaro, 2020)—are enhanced in a certain direction, shaping
the shared meaning construction and concretely modulating
hopes and expectations. Evidence “suggests that ‘expectations’
and even ‘cognitive information’ are not necessary for OLP
efficacy” (Kaptchuk, 2018, p. 319). As a result of participation,
certain pre-reflective processes are encouraged while reflective
aspects are minimized or put on hold.
Participatory sense-making pervades all social interactions,
not only that between patient and practitioner. The placebo by
proxy hypothesis (Grelotti and Kaptchuk, 2011) proposes that the
wider social environment, through the feelings and perceptions
of clinicians, family members, and friends, also contributes to
placebo effects. Studies show that placebo effects in children
can be modulated by the expectations of their parents (Rheims
et al., 2008; Weimer et al., 2013). We suggest that it is the
situatedness of embodied agents in complex social environments,
and the meaning generated in participation, that modulates
placebo effects. A placebo intervention on a child can alter the
behavior of her parents, and their augmented enthusiasm, more
positive attitudes, or less worry and concern, can affect the child’s
pre-reflective bodily responses.
Participation is always embedded in cultural processes. We
cannot assume that these are simply contextual factors. Almost
every healing procedure is associated with a ritual aspect of
social performance (Thompson et al., 2009), which is related
to the uncertainty of the situation that is out of one’s control,
and the hope for relief through the intervention. Practices such
as praying, which has been associated with placebo effects,
owe their apparent healing capacities to previous culturally
meaningful social encounters (Luhrmann, 2013) that shape
uncertainty, facilitate imagination, and enhance hopes—also
when they are practiced individually. Faith healing goes along
similar lines. Likewise, biomedical procedures also involve ritual
aspects that can be extremely powerful. Invasive interventions
are usually performed in more severe conditions, require
sophisticated technologies, and are carried out by specialized
personnel. This could explain why, for instance, placebo
surgery can elicit long-lasting benefits similar to “true” surgeries
in diverse conditions (Jonas et al., 2015). Indeed, healing
rituals alone—without associated “specific” procedures—have
been performed for centuries, and they still play a role in
many cultures (Kaptchuk, 2011). We understand rituals as
triggering meaning responses and individuation processes, i.e.,
drastic changes in the set of tensions that are part of the
embodied experience of the individual in her context. These
individuation processes contribute to releasing or regulating
part of the existing tensions and as a result, can lead to
alleviating suffering.
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The enactive perspective on participatory sense-making calls
for widening the focus of placebo research to include the
richness of culturally embedded social interactions as processes of
participation, over and beyond the social skills of the participants.
These processes are amenable to quantitative and qualitative
research (Kelley et al., 2009; De Jaegher et al., 2010).
CULTURAL VARIABILITY IN PLACEBO,
HEALTH AND ILLNESS
Moving beyond dyadic interactions and taking into account
social processes at different scales, the enactive approach provides
elements to explain cultural variability in placebo, health, and
illness (e.g., Moerman, 2000, 2002; Hutchinson and Moerman,
2018). To give an example of this variability, it has been shown
that the color of a pill can modulate placebo responses, typically
red having an effect of stimulation and blue of sedation (Jacobs
and Nordan, 1979). An exception seems to be Italian men, who,
at least at some point, showed a tendency to respond to blue-
colored pills oppositely (blue is the color of the Italian national
soccer team) (Cattaneo et al., 1970; Lucchelli et al., 1978).
Moerman (2002) notes that Chinese Americans that show
certain combinations of disease and birth year that are “ill-fated”
according to Chinese astrology die significatively earlier than
non-Chinese Americans born in the same year (Phillips et al.,
1993). The stronger their belief in astrology the earlier they die.
The system of beliefs, social practices, and cultural narratives
not only modulate the response to particular interventions—
as in the ritual aspect of placebo procedures—but strongly
transverse meaningful embodied experience. Although close
to placebo and nocebo phenomena, these influences are not
strictly placebo effects, as they lack a concrete intervention
(i.e., a common trigger). As a result, they may be captured
by the concept of cultural affordances, “the possibilities for
interaction with a particular social context or eco-social niche
fromwhich an individual’s experience, intentionality, and action-
readiness emerge.” (Kirmayer and Gómez-Carrillo, 2019, p.
176). Complementing Frenkel (2008), they can be considered as
“cultural affordances of illness,” which can give rise to “cultural
nocebos” (the trigger could be the diagnosis of the disease or
bodily sensations interpreted as symptoms of the disease).
Similarly, the medical and legal context seems to play a
relevant role in the late whiplash syndrome. This condition
involves a cluster of chronic symptoms (e.g., neck pain,
headache, cognitive impairment) that are associated with
rear-end car collisions, but its lack of existence in some
non-Western countries, like Lithuania, awakened controversy
(Schrader et al., 1996; but see Freeman et al., 1999). The
general awareness of the syndrome by physicians and by the
public, the possibility of obtaining financial compensation, the
expectation of a severe injury (use of collar and stretcher after the
accident), misattribution of medically unexplained symptoms,
and attention (by oneself, by going to a practitioner frequently,
or by friends and relatives) can contribute to this condition
(Ferrari and Schrader, 2001). These explanations and those
offered for placebo effects are remarkably similar and support
our claim of the generality of meaningful embodied and situated
interactions underlying placebo phenomena. “Experience is
always preceded by and embedded in cultural systems of
meanings and practices, which shape modes of attention and
action, as well as interpretive frames and discursive practices that
have causal effects as part of hierarchically nested loops linking
social position, cognition and bodily processes.” (Kirmayer and
Gómez-Carrillo, 2019, p. 172). In this view, placebo phenomena
are just a subgroup ofmeaningful interactive experiences eliciting
bodily responses, which are challenging to account for with
current biomedical models.
ENACTIVE CONCEPTIONS OF HEALTH
To see, as enactivist do, the patient engaged in a series of
mutually dependent and entangled processes at different
scales, tallies fairly well with non-reductionist accounts
of pathology and health. In contrast with the mechanistic
tendencies in biomedicine, Goldstein (1954) conceived
pathology as inherently relational, involving the whole
organism in interaction with her sociomaterial environment.
Pathology cannot be reduced to a symptom or dysfunction
but depends on the subjective and objective assessments
of available skills, practices, and capabilities for one’s self-
realization in a given context. According to Canguilhem
(2012), external norms, based on statistics, cannot set the
boundary between the normal and the pathological. Group to
individual inferences are risky. The entangled dimensions of
embodiment and multiple processes of individuation at play in
each person are at the root of this difficulty. The pathological,
then, is more related to the powers and potentialities for
following/changing/incorporating/establishing a patient’s
own norms, than to the patient’s position concerning the
clinician’s norm. For instance, people with autistic traits (Mercier
et al., 2000), or impairments in motor control (Toro et al.,
2020), can enjoy satisfactory lives and perceive themselves
as healthy, despite of their deviation from standard bodies,
capabilities, and ways of interacting common in Western
societies (see De Jaegher, 2013).
Following Canguilhem, health depends on the relative
capabilities for coping when confronted with novel or dangerous
situations, or when breakdowns occur, i.e., on the ability to
release or regulate tension generated in such cases. We have
described living bodies as self-individuating processes that are
continuously creating opportunities for further individuation.
The available potentialities, however, require releasing or
transforming tensions. If the processes of generating and
releasing tensions cannot operate, tensions accumulate and
other processes can attempt to compensate, with only partial
or no success, and potentially causing other problems. As a
result, bodily symptoms, dysfunctions, limitations, and suffering
emerge as “positive” compensations rather than “negative” lacks
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012).
The biopsychosocial model classically proposed by Engel
(1977) (see also George and Engel, 1980), with its origin in
Systems Theory, its emphasis on the whole person situated in
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 660118
Arandia and Di Paolo Placebo From an Enactive Perspective
her environment, and its critique to reductionist and dualist
assumptions in biomedicine, also resonates with the enactive
approach. However, it has been often applied in a fragmented
manner (Stilwell and Harman, 2019), considering the “bio-
psycho-social” realms as separate entities, and not paying enough
attention to the interaction and entanglements of these domains.
As we have said, tensions can be created at each dimension
of embodiment or through conflicting normativities between
different dimensions. They can be generated, transformed, and
released using reflective and pre-reflective processes, usually
through a combination of both. A placebo intervention can
trigger the regulation of tensions leading to the individuation
of new meanings and a reconfiguration of the biopsychosocial
situation. The positive influence of enhanced self-efficacy in
therapy and the effects of over-attributing improvements to one’s
efforts show the importance of meaning and the sense of agency
in regulating tension. Not only does an action matter, but so does
its interpretation, the meaning ascribed to that action as part of
one’s skills and capabilities for interacting in a particular context.
Lived experience plays a key role in illness and also in the
healing process (Toombs, 1987). We have shown the importance
of interactive elements in the therapeutic encounter. The capacity
for social relatedness in clinicians and therapists (and patients!)
is crucial to be able to generate shared meaning and modulate
hopes and expectations in such a way as to facilitate recovery.
The transformative role often attributed to illness (Lindsey,
1996; Carel, 2013) is easy to accommodate from the perspective
of active embodied agency. Themechanistic body leads to a clear-
cut distinction between health and illness. By contrast, studies
sensitive to subjective experience interpret health and illness as
a change in degree along a continuum (Toombs, 1988; Lindsey,
1996). A change that is not a mere loss or excess, but that
solicits a reaction. Illness is perceived along with accumulated
tension that cannot be managed, constraining the possibilities for
(inter)action—as in patients with arterial disease and pain that
limits mobility (Mol, 2002). This uncertain situation demands
attention, action, and a search for meaning. In contrast, the
healthy are interpreted as capable of creating opportunities,
displaying options to open new potentialities, and coping
adequately with the tensions generated.
The processes of tension creation and release help explain
placebo effects also in “healthy” individuals. Tension is not
exclusive of illness or disease, but ubiquitous in living bodies, and
meaningful interactions are the main mechanism for regulating
tension.Most studies of placebo phenomena in “healthy” subjects
(e.g., Fillmore and Vogel-Sprott, 1992; Arntz and Claassens,
2004) can be interpreted as artificially generating tensions
(e.g., nociceptive stimulus, “cognitive” task) and analyzing
differences in their regulation following interventions (e.g.,
placebo analgesia, sham caffeine).
ENACTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PLACEBO
RESEARCH
We have presented an exposition of some central enactive
ideas. Table 1 summarizes the various assumptions we
TABLE 1 | Comparison of underlying assumptions in classical explanations of









Non-reductionist framework based on





known vs. knower, individual
vs. society
Non-dualistic approach leading to life-mind
continuity and deeply entangled organic,
sensorimotor, and intersubjective dimensions
of embodiment
Little attention to lived
experience: subjective
measures employed only to
supplement objective
measures
Lived experience as constitutive of life and
mind, demanding first-person methodologies in




perturbations in a lawful
manner
Patients are agents actively regulating
interactions with their (social) environment.
Placebo interventions trigger individuation
processes within a set of interrelated patterns
of tensions that each individual enacts
Representationalism:
cognition (usually separate





Perception and action are completely
intertwined, giving rise to agency and the
(reflective and pre-reflective) sense of agency.
Cognition—tightly linked to
affectivity—emerges from these meaningful




The intersubjective domain is both enabling
and constitutive of experience. Interaction
dynamics are not fully exhausted by the sum of
individual actions
Temporality: snapshot
measures of variables on a
short timescale. No focus
on cross-scale correlations
and dynamics of living
bodies
Living bodies are interpreted as unfinished
entities in an ongoing self-individuation
process, full of tensions and potentialities, and
deeply influenced by their history and previous
experiences. Placebo interventions act as
triggers within this configuration
have identified within traditional explanations of placebo
and their corresponding contrasting assumptions in the
enactive approach. It is time to take stock and summarize the
main elements of our proposal and how they can broaden
current explanations of placebo phenomena and inspire
future research.
• Non-dualism. Enaction offers a non-dualistic theoretical
articulation for explaining the continuity between life and
mind, including the concepts of autonomy and sense-
making, theminimal requirements for agency, and operational
definitions of social interaction and participatory sense-
making. The enactive approach entails neither reduction
to biology, nor psychology, but expresses a relational-
dynamical perspective that is not trapped within the
orbit of traditional dichotomies such as subjective/objective,
body/mind, individual/society, etc.
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• Entwined dimensions of embodiment. The enactive
conception of human bodies goes beyond passive, physiology-
bound, and mechanistic perspectives. Bodies are active
processes of ongoing individuation and cycles of regulation
involving complex and entangled organic, sensorimotor, and
social dimensions. The multiple cycles of regulation interact
non-linearly and reflect the active history-in-the-making of
organism and environment. None of these dimensions can by
itself define or constitute a human body. One dimension may
be more relevant in particular cases, but all of them participate
in multiple constitutive relations. This non-universalist
conception of embodiment helps make sense of the variability
and non-specificity of placebo and the wide range of factors
that modulate these effects.
• A relational-processual interpretation of placebo. Following
Simondon’s work, human bodies are constantly achieving
individuation and regulating tensions within and between
their dimensions of embodiment: tensions between internal
processes, between sedimented structures and potentialities,
between internal and external dynamics, between the
individual and the collective, and so on. The useful
distinction between the preindividual, i.e., the potentialities
for individuation, and those factors that act as triggers can
shift the strategy for explaining what placebo interventions
do. Interventions do not by themselves initiate a causal
chain that leads mechanistically to placebo responses, but
trigger individuation events in already unfolding dynamical
processes, helping break a deadlock, modulating the relative
intensities of physiological, sensorimotor, and collective
individuation processes. Other times they have no effect at all.
• Pre-reflective and reflective aspects of agency. Since
cognition is manifested in the active regulation of the coupling
between bodies and environment, mental states from the
enactive perspective are never entirely private, though they
may have different overt and non-overt components. The
distinction between conscious and non-conscious processes
is specious from this point of view, particularly when non-
conscious activity is loaded with complex cognitive functions,
such as predictions or inferences. We propose a more
workable and phenomenologically defensible distinction, that
between pre-reflective and reflective aspects of agency. More
workable because it is easier to access empirically and more
defensible because it foregrounds the agency of the patient.
Tension release (diminishing harmful reflective activity)
and the modulation of pre-reflective motor intentionality,
for example, can help make sense of placebo interventions
that induce anxiety-reduction (Petrovic et al., 2005),
unblock self-healing mechanisms (e.g., Walach and Jonas,
2004), or modulate immune responses (e.g., Evans, 2005;
Pacheco-López et al., 2006).
• Participatory sense-making. Social and cultural factors are
acknowledged to modulate placebo effects. However, less
emphasis has been put on the irreducibly relational processes
of interaction and the conditions that affect the degree and
kind of participation in these processes. Meaning does not
arise solely as an individual response to an intervention but is
jointly constructed in a process of participatory sense-making.
This explains why healing rituals and participation-enhancing
factors can positively modulate placebo effects, over and above
the social skills of the individual participants.
As a complement to these contributions, we can specify some
research guidelines that can help overcome the limitations
of the theoretical assumptions described earlier. We suggest
(1) expanding the investigation of first-personal experience,
(2) systematically studying the interplay between pre-reflective
(habits, self-efficacy, emotional dispositions, attentional patterns)
and reflective (expectations, but also hopes, motivations,
narratives, perceived self-efficacy, and interpretations associated
with the placebo intervention and the healing process) aspects
of agency in a dynamic manner, and (3) analyzing in-depth
interactive experiences and participative processes in addition to
individual social skills.
If we take the entwined dimensions of embodiment seriously,
this calls for the combination of diverse methodologies (from
first-, second-, and third-person perspectives) to assess the
impact of placebo interventions on the way of life of patients and
unveil hidden connections between bodily activity, behavioral
patterns, and interpersonal processes. This can be challenging,
but good examples exist. Despite the usefulness of self-report
scales and questionnaires, the complexity of human experience,
especially pain itself, cannot be reduced to a few numbers.
Given the insights provided by a few phenomenological studies
already performed on placebo (such as the work by Kelley
et al., 2009), we find it advisable to include phenomenological
methods to investigate both individual experiences of patients
and practitioners, and interactive experiences in placebo research
(e.g., Langdridge, 2007; Davidsen, 2013). We find especially
useful the proposal for enactive-informed phenomenological
methods (Stilwell and Harman, 2021).
These first-person phenomenological tools should be
combined with traditional third-person data, as proposed by
neurophenomenology (Lutz and Thompson, 2003) to inspire
novel experimental paradigms in placebo investigations. The
Multimodal Assessment model of Pain (MAP, Wideman et al.,
2019) is a novel framework in pain research that emphasizes
personal narratives while mixing quantitative and qualitative
methods. Although it is quite individualistic and mainly focused
on reflective activity, it is a relevant working example applicable
to placebo research. By analyzing the phenomenological
work by Kelley et al. (2009) in-depth, and by looking at the
implementation details of the OLP experimental paradigm, we
intend to highlight the potential of investigating interactive
experiences in placebo research, including the pre-reflective
aspects—see, for example, the role of the clinicians’ facial
expressions (Chen et al., 2019) or clinicians performance in
placebo analgesia (Czerniak et al., 2016). For instance, it would be
interesting to compare OLP procedures with different rationales
and different performances of the clinicians while tracking the
personal interpretation of the intervention in each participant.
Such studies may shed light on the role that implicit influences,
uncertainty, and imagination play in this experimental paradigm.
Depending on the condition under investigation, empirical work
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on placebo could be complemented with questionnaires (to assess
pain, self-efficacy, moods, anxiety) and interviews with different
kinds of openness and structure to better grasp individual
experiences and narratives. These could help unveil emotional
variations and pre-reflective phenomena previously unnoticed
(Stilwell and Harman, 2021) and allow a more detailed account
of expectations and different kinds of hope (Eaves et al., 2016).
Studies could also be complemented with diverse measures
to track bodily activity associated with emotional experiences
(e.g., heart rate variability, skin conductance) and eye-tracking
methods to investigate attentional patterns, for instance, after an
injury associated with pain and movement limitations.
In addition to this non-exhaustive list, techniques originating
in the fields of anthropology and ethnography can offer valuable
tools for analyzing the impact of placebo interventions on the
way of life of patients (ethnomethodology, Hutchinson and
Moerman, 2018;meta-ethnography, Hardman et al., 2020). These
methodologies allow tracking a variety of looping effects with
therapeutic potential, as illustrated by the meta-ethnographic
work by Mol (2002) already discussed. This work compares the
way of life of patients with arterial disease in the lower limbs
undergoing either walking therapy—that reduces limitations
associated with the disease and enhancing social life—or
surgery—directly affecting vessels, but also patient’s life through
hospitalization, visits, and attention from relatives and the
consequences of an invasive procedure. Investigating personal
experiences, narratives and practices is challenging but can
lead to a more complete picture. We think it is necessary to
shed light on the variety of interrelated processes underlying
physiological, psychological, and sociological domains, boost our
understanding of the striking individual variability pervading
placebo phenomena, and take advantage of the therapeutic
potential placebo research contains to improve clinical practice.
DISCUSSION
The enactive contributions toward a relational-processual
conception of placebo effects and their relation to similar
proposals will no doubt deserve further elaboration. Our
emphasis on lived experience coincides with ecological-
phenomenological accounts (Frenkel, 2008) but while we also
recognize the role of pre-reflective processes such as motor
intentionality and affordances of healing, we do not think a
full explanation of placebo phenomena can be constrained to
those. Human agency is also manifested reflectively, in language,
self-control, and social interaction, and so phenomena such as
expectations can indeed be key for understanding some placebo
effects. The difference from more traditional explanations is
that expectations are not conceived as private mental states, but
as dynamic processes of cognitive individuation involving the
situated body in all its dimensions.
Ongaro and Kaptchuk (2019) have suggested that it is possible
to bring together the active aspects of agency emphasized by
enaction and expectation-based explanations of placebo via
recent work on predictive processing (e.g., Clark, 2015; Allen
and Friston, 2018). Apart from unresolved problems that are
relevant to placebo research, such as the difficulties in accounting
for affect-biased attention using predictive processing (Ransom
et al., 2020), the similarities with the enactive approach are only
superficial. Without entering into such a controversial topic, we
can briefly mention that enaction emphasizes active historical
processes at physiological, psychological, and social scales, which
realize path-dependent trajectories and explain the human bodily
and psychological difference and variability (Di Paolo et al., 2017,
2018). There is also an emphasis on the interpenetration between
the dimensions of embodiment. In contrast to these two key
enactive ideas, the mathematical framework of predictive coding
strictly depends on the postulation of non-equilibrium steady
states that downplay the influence of history and on the statistical
compartmentalization of the organism (via Markov blankets)
that may be applicable in some circumstances, but in general
negates the entwinement of organic, sensorimotor, and social
processes, and the interaction across multiple scales enactivists
defend (see Di Paolo et al., 2021). Regarding placebo research,
we find especially puzzling the explanation of OLP in terms of
predictive processing provided by Ongaro and Kaptchuk (2019),
as a result of the tension between contradictory information.
OLP involves information that is certain and precise (placebos
are inert) and information that is rather uncertain and imprecise
pointing in the opposite direction (placebos may sometimes
“work”). According to this framework, different sources of
information are weighted depending on their precision, and thus
the fact that placebos are inert should be weighted strongly. OLP
is, at first sight, a case that challenges predictive processing. If
it does not, it can only be because other intervening factors
distort the role played by a certain and precise piece of conscious
information, but the danger of this move is that predictive coding
can then be made to explain anything in this way.
The enactive perspective foregrounds sense-making and so it
strongly resonates with explanations based onmeaning responses
(Moerman and Jonas, 2002). But we are not limiting the relevant
processes to conscious semantic constructions elicited by an
intervention. There is a danger of putting too much emphasis
on the mental side of things, neglecting both organic and social
processes. Our emphasis on the entanglement and ongoing
activity along the three dimensions of embodiment aims at
preventing underscoring any one aspect in isolation. This is not
the same as saying everything matters to the same degree for
every case, but that the methodological requirements to frame an
explanation for particular placebo effects must be established first
using a framework in which no dimension is neglected by default.
In this work, we have focused on the enactive notions of
bodies, sensorimotor agency, and participatory sense-making.
The phenomenological, the existential, the affective, and the
sociocultural dimension have not been analyzed in detail but
they play a key role in placebo phenomena, and we hope to have
shown that the enactive framework is in a position to offer tools
to investigate and accommodate them.
To sum up, explanations of placebo phenomena remain
elusive due to a series of epistemic problems. These include
the background assumptions with which placebo effects are
approached, the methods with which they are measured,
and the paradox-inducing dualisms that adopt as a premise
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a gulf between terms that satisfactory explanations must
bring together. Epistemic problems require epistemic solutions.
Some of these solutions can be found in embodied cognitive
science, particularly in the enactive approach, but also in
related perspectives informed by phenomenology, ecological
psychology, or anthropology. The investigation of placebo
phenomena requires an epistemic shift toward seeing patients
and practitioners as active social agents engaged in the regulation
of tensions within and between intertwined dimensions of
embodiment. This shift calls for objective measures to be
expanded and also complemented with an investigation of
processes of participation and relatedness. The resulting
“engaged epistemology” (De Jaegher, 2019) allows us to make
sense of the particularities of concrete interactive experiences.
What could count as an explanation of placebo effects
if they are so context- and person-dependent? Are adequate
descriptions the best we can do? The enactive approach provides
a framework for generating explanations and new hypotheses,
but not at the expense of abstractions that rely on a desire
for one-size-fits-all single principles. Phenomenological methods
(Stilwell and Harman, 2021), ethnomethodology (Hutchinson
and Moerman, 2018), meta-ethnographic techniques (Hardman
et al., 2020), and further developments in embodied and
dynamical systems approaches in cognitive science will also be
necessary for the understanding of meaningful interactions in
a relational and situated manner, both within the therapeutic
context and beyond. Results and methodologies from diverse
fields (including first-, second-, and third-person approaches)
must be combined, looking at embodied activity in performing
agents at different scales and dimensions, and taking into
account subpersonal, personal, and collective processes. Such
an effort will encourage a fruitful dialectic between personal
particularities and scientific generalization improving our
understanding of placebo phenomena, health, and human
embodied experience.
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K., et al. (2017). Classical conditioning without verbal suggestions elicits
placebo analgesia and nocebo hyperalgesia. PLoS ONE 12:e0181856.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0181856
Benedetti, F., Amanzio, M., Baldi, S., Casadio, C., and Maggi, G. (1999). Inducing
placebo respiratory depressant responses in humans via opioid receptors. Euro.
J. Neurosci. 11, 625–631. doi: 10.1046/j.1460-9568.1999.00465.x
Benedetti, F., Arduino, C., Costa, S., Vighetti, S., Tarenzi, L., Rainero, I.,
et al. (2006). Loss of expectation-related mechanisms in Alzheimer’s
disease makes analgesic therapies less effective. Pain 121, 133–144.
doi: 10.1016/j.pain.2005.12.016
Benedetti, F., Frisaldi, E., Barbiani, D., Camerone, E., and Shaibani, A.
(2019). Nocebo and the contribution of psychosocial factors to the
generation of pain. J. Neur. Transm. 127, 687–696. doi: 10.1007/s00702-019-
02104-x
Benedetti, F., Lanotte, M., Lopiano, L., and Colloca, L. (2007). When words are
painful: Unraveling the mechanisms of the nocebo effect. Neuroscience 147,
260–271. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroscience.2007.02.020
Bennett, M. R., and Hacker, P. M. S. (2003). Philosophical Foundations of
Neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Boot, W. R., Simons, D. J., Stothart, C., and Stutts, C. (2013). The pervasive
problem with placebos in psychology: why active control groups are not
sufficient to rule out placebo effects. Perspect. Psychol. Sci. 8, 445–454.
doi: 10.1177/1745691613491271
Bootzin, R. R., and Caspi, O. (2002). “Explanatory mechanisms for placebo
effects: cognition, personality and social learning,” in Science of the Placebo,
eds H. A. Guess, A. Kleinman, J. W. Kusek, and L. W. Engel (London: BMJ
Books), 108–132.
Büchel, C., Geuter, S., Sprenger, C., and Eippert, F. (2014). Placebo
analgesia: a predictive coding perspective. Neuron 81, 1223–1239.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2014.02.042
Buhle, J. T., Stevens, B. L., Friedman, J. J., and Wager, T. D. (2012). Distraction
and placebo: two separate routes to pain control. Psychol. Sci. 23, 246–253.
doi: 10.1177/0956797611427919
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 16 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 660118
Arandia and Di Paolo Placebo From an Enactive Perspective
Canguilhem, G. (2012). On the Normal and the Pathological, Vol. 3. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel Publishing Company.
Carel, H. (2013). Bodily doubt. J. Consci. Stud. 20, 178–197.
Carvalho, C., Caetano, J. M., Cunha, L., Rebouta, P., Kaptchuk, T. J., and Kirsch, I.
(2016). Open-label placebo treatment in chronic low back pain: a randomized
controlled trial. Pain 157, 2766–2772. doi: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000000700
Cattaneo, A. D., Lucchelli, P. E., and Filippucci, G. (1970). Sedative effects of
placebo treatment. Euro. J. Clin. Pharmacol. 3, 43–45. doi: 10.1007/BF00560290
Chabot, P. (2013). The Philosophy of Simondon. Between Technology and
Individuation, eds G. Kirkpatrick and A. Krefetz. London: Bloomsbury.
Charlesworth, J. E., Petkovic, G., Kelley, J. M., Hunter, M., Onakpoya, I., Roberts,
N., et al. (2017). Effects of placebos without deception compared with no
treatment: a systematic review and meta-analysis. J. Evid. Based Med. 10,
97–107. doi: 10.1111/jebm.12251
Chen, P. H. A., Cheong, J. H., Jolly, E., Elhence, H., Wager, T. D., and Chang, L.
J. (2019). Socially transmitted placebo effects. Nat. Hum. Behav. 3, 1295–1305.
doi: 10.1038/s41562-019-0749-5
Clark, A. (2015). “Embodied Prediction,” in Open MIND: 7(T), eds T. Metzinger
and J. M. Windt (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group).
Coleshill, M. J., Sharpe, L., Colloca, L., Zachariae, R., and Colagiuri, B.
(2018). Placebo and active treatment additivity in placebo analgesia:
research to date and future directions. Int. Rev. Neurobiol. 139, 407–441.
doi: 10.1016/bs.irn.2018.07.021
Collins, T. C., Lunos, S., and Ahluwalia, J. S. (2010). Self-efficacy is associated with
walking ability in persons with diabetes mellitus and peripheral arterial disease.
Vasc. Med. 15, 189–195. doi: 10.1177/1358863X10362604
Colloca, L., and Benedetti, F. (2009). Placebo analgesia induced by social
observational learning. Pain 144, 28–34. doi: 10.1016/j.pain.2009.01.033
Colloca, L., Lopiano, L., Lanotte, M., and Benedetti, F. (2004). Overt versus covert
treatment for pain, anxiety, and Parkinson’s disease. Lancet Neurol. 3, 679–684.
doi: 10.1016/S1474-4422(04)00908-1
Colombetti, G. (2011). Varieties of pre-reflective self-awareness: foreground and
background bodily feelings in emotion experience. Inquiry 54, 293–313.
doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2011.575003
Colombetti, G. (2014). The Feeling Body: Affective Science Meets the Enactive Mind.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019958.001.0001
Corsi, N., and Colloca, L. (2017). Placebo and nocebo effects: the advantage
of measuring expectations and psychological factors. Front. Psychol. 8:308.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00308
Curie, A., Yang, K., Kirsch, I., Gollub, R. L., des Portes, V., Kaptchuk, T. J.,
et al. (2015). Placebo responses in genetically determined intellectual disability:
a meta-analysis. PLoS ONE 10:e0133316. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.01
33316
Custers, R., and Aarts, H. (2010). The unconscious will: how the pursuit
of goals operates outside of conscious awareness. Science 329, 47–50.
doi: 10.1126/science.1188595
Czerniak, E., Biegon, A., Ziv, A., Karnieli-Miller, O., Weiser, M., Alon, U., et al.
(2016). Manipulating the placebo response in experimental pain by altering
doctor’s performance style. Front. Psychol. 7:874. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00874
Dale, R., Fusaroli, R., Duran, N. D., and Richardson, D. C. (2013). The
self-organization of human interaction. Psychol. Learn. Motivat. 59, 43–95.
doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-407187-2.00002-2
Darlow, B., Fullen, B. M., Dean, S., Hurley, D. A., Baxter, G. D., and Dowell,
A. (2012). The association between health care professional attitudes and
beliefs and the attitudes and beliefs, clinical management, and outcomes of
patients with low back pain: a systematic review. Euro. J. Pain 16, 3–17.
doi: 10.1016/j.ejpain.2011.06.006
Davidsen, A. S. (2013). Phenomenological approaches in psychology and health
sciences. Quali. Res. Psychol. 10, 318–339. doi: 10.1080/14780887.2011.608466
de Haan, S. (2020). Enactive Psychiatry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
doi: 10.1017/9781108685214
De Jaegher, H. (2013). Embodiment and sense-making in autism. Front. Integrat.
Neurosci. 7:15. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2013.00015
De Jaegher, H. (2018). “The intersubjective turn,” in The Oxford Handbook
of Cognition: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive and Extended, eds A.
Newen, S. Gallagher, L. de Bruin (Oxford University Press), 453–468.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.24
De Jaegher, H. (2019). Loving and knowing: reflections for an engaged
epistemology. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci. doi: 10.1007/s11097-019-09634-5. [Epub
ahead of print].
De Jaegher, H., and Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making. Phenomenol.
Cogn. Sci. 6, 485–507. doi: 10.1007/s11097-007-9076-9
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E., and Gallagher, S. (2010). Can social
interaction constitute social cognition? Trends Cogn. Sci. 14, 441–447.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009
Dereclenne, E. (2019). Simondon and enaction: the articulation of life, subjectivity,
and technics. Adapt. Behav. doi: 10.1177/1059712319861915. [Epub ahead of
print].
Dewey, J. (1922/1988). Human Nature and Conduct. Carbondale, IL: Southern
Illinois University Press.
Di Paolo, E., Thompson, E., and Beer, R. D. (2021). Laying down a forking path:
Incompatibilities between enaction and the free energy principle. Preprint.
doi: 10.31234/osf.io/d9v8f
Di Paolo, E. A. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenol.
Cogn. Sci. 4, 429–452. doi: 10.1007/s11097-005-9002-y
Di Paolo, E. A. (2018). “The enactive conception of life,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Cognition: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive and Extended, eds
A. Newen, S. Gallagher, L. de Bruin (Oxford University Press), 71–94.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.4
Di Paolo, E. A. (2020). Enactive becoming. Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci.
doi: 10.1007/s11097-019-09654-1. [Epub ahead of print].
Di Paolo, E. A., Buhrmann, T., and Barandiaran, X. (2017). Sensorimotor
Life: An Enactive Proposal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.001.0001
Di Paolo, E. A., Cuffari, E. C., and De Jaegher, H. (2018). Linguistic Bodies:
The Continuity Between Life and Language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
doi: 10.7551/mitpress/11244.001.0001
Di Paolo, E. A., and Thompson, E. (2014). “The enactive approach,” in
The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, ed L. Shapiro (Routledge
Press), 68–78.
DiFrisco, J. (2014). Hylomorphism and the metabolic closure conception of life.
Acta Biotheor. 62, 499–525. doi: 10.1007/s10441-014-9233-9
Dreyfus, H. L. (2002). Refocusing the question: Can there be skillful coping without
propositional representations or brain representations? Phenomenol. Cogn. Sci.
1, 413–425 doi: 10.1023/A:1021303723047
Eaves, E. R., Nichter, M., and Ritenbaugh, C. (2016). Ways of hoping: navigating
the paradox of hope and despair in chronic pain. Cult. Med. Psychiatry 40,
35–58. doi: 10.1007/s11013-015-9465-4
Eaves, E. R., Sherman, K. J., Ritenbaugh, C., Hsu, C., Nichter, M., Turner, J. A., et al.
(2015). A qualitative study of changes in expectations over time among patients
with chronic low back pain seeking four CAM therapies. BMC Complem.
Alternat. Med. 15:12. doi: 10.1186/s12906-015-0531-9
Engel, G. L. (1977). The need for a newmedical model: a challenge for biomedicine.
Science 196, 129–136. doi: 10.1126/science.847460
Evans, D. (2005). Suppression of the acute-phase response as a
biological mechanism for the placebo effect. Med. Hypotheses 64, 1–7.
doi: 10.1016/j.mehy.2004.08.009
Evers, A. W. M., Colloca, L., Blease, C., Annoni, M., Atlas, L. Y., Benedetti, F., et al.
(2018). Implications of placebo and nocebo effects for clinical practice: expert
consensus. Psychother. Psychosom. 87, 204–210. doi: 10.1159/000490354
Ferrari, R., and Schrader, H. (2001). The late whiplash syndrome: a
biopsychosocial approach. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 70, 722–726.
doi: 10.1136/jnnp.70.6.722
Fillmore, M., and Vogel-Sprott, M. (1992). Expected effect of caffeine on motor
performance predicts the type of response to placebo. Psychopharmacology, 106,
209–214. doi: 10.1007/BF02801974
Finniss, D. G., Kaptchuk, T. J., Miller, F., and Benedetti, F. (2010). Biological,
clinical, and ethical advances of placebo effects. Lancet 375, 686–695.
doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61706-2
Freeman, M. D., Croft, A. C., Rossignol, A. M., Weaver, D. S., and Reiser, M.
(1999). A review and methodologic critique of the literature refuting whiplash
syndrome. Spine 24, 86–96. doi: 10.1097/00007632-199901010-00022
Freeman, W. J. (2000). Neurodynamics: An Exploration in Mesoscopic Brain
Dynamic. London: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4471-0371-4
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 17 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 660118
Arandia and Di Paolo Placebo From an Enactive Perspective
Frenkel, O. (2008). A phenomenology of the ‘placebo effect’: taking meaning from
the mind to the body. J. Med. Philoso. 33, 58–79. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhm005
Fuchs, T. (2011). The brain–a mediating organ. J. Consci. Stud.
18, 196–221.
Fuchs, T. (2017). Ecology of the Brain: The Phenomenology and
Biology of the Embodied Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi: 10.1093/med/9780199646883.001.0001
Gallagher, S. (2012). Multiple aspects in the sense of agency.New Ideas Psychol. 30,
15–31. doi: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.003
Gallagher, S. (2017). Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198794325.001.0001
Gallagher, S., and Zahavi, D. (2013). The Phenomenological Mind. London:
Routledge. doi: 10.4324/9780203126752
Geers, A. L., Briñol, P., and Petty, R. E. (2019). An analysis of the basic processes of
formation and change of placebo expectations. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 23, 211–229.
doi: 10.1037/gpr0000171
Geers, A. L., Helfer, S. G., Weiland, P. E., and Kosbab, K. (2006). Expectations and
placebo response: a laboratory investigation into the role of somatic focus. J.
Behav. Med. 29, 171–178. doi: 10.1007/s10865-005-9040-5
Geers, A. L., andMiller, F. G. (2014). Understanding and translating the knowledge
about placebo effects: the contribution of psychology. Curr. Opin. Psychiatry 27,
326–331. doi: 10.1097/YCO.0000000000000082
Geers, A. L., Rose, J. P., Fowler, S. L., Rasinski, H. M., Brown, J. A., and Helfer,
S. G. (2013). Why does choice enhance treatment effectiveness? Using placebo
treatments to demonstrate the role of personal control. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 105,
549–566. doi: 10.1037/a0034005
Geers, A. L., Weiland, P. E., Kosbab, K., Landry, S. J., and Helfer, S. G. (2005).
Goal activation, expectations, and the placebo effect. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 89,
143–159. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.2.143
George, E., and Engel, L. (1980). The clinical application of the biopsychosocial
model. Am. J. Psychiatry 137, 535–544. doi: 10.1176/ajp.137.5.535
Geuter, S., Koban, L., and Wager, T. D. (2017). The cognitive neuroscience of
placebo effects: concepts, predictions, and physiology. Ann. Rev. Neurosci. 40,
167–188. doi: 10.1146/annurev-neuro-072116-031132
Goldstein, K. (1954). The concept of health, disease and therapy; basic
ideas for an organismic psychotherapy. Am. J. Psychother. 8, 745–764.
doi: 10.1176/appi.psychotherapy.1954.8.4.745
Goli, F. (ed.). (2016). “Biosemiotic medicine: Healing in the world of meaning,” in
Studies in Neuroscience, Consciousness and Spirituality, Vol. 5. Cham: Springer
International Publishing. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-35092-9
Greenwald, A. G., and Lai, C. K. (2020). Implicit social cognition. Ann. Rev.
Psychol. 71, 419–445. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010419-050837
Grelotti, D. J., and Kaptchuk, T. J. (2011). Placebo by proxy. BMJ 343:d4345.
doi: 10.1136/bmj.d4345
Hacking, I. (1999). The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Hardman, D., and Ongaro, G. (2020). Subjunctive medicine: a manifesto. Soc. Sci.
Med. 256:113039. doi: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113039
Hardman, D. I., Geraghty, A. W., Howick, J., Roberts, N., and Bishop, F. L.
(2019). A discursive exploration of public perspectives on placebos and their
effects. Health Psychol. Open 6:2055102919832313. doi: 10.1177/205510291983
2313
Hardman, D. I., Geraghty, A. W., Lewith, G., Lown, M., Viecelli, C., and Bishop,
F. L. (2020). From substance to process: a meta-ethnographic review of how
healthcare professionals and patients understand placebos and their effects in
primary care. Health 24, 315–340. doi: 10.1177/1363459318800169
Hoenemeyer, T. W., Kaptchuk, T. J., Mehta, T. S., and Fontaine, K. R. (2018).
Open-label placebo treatment for cancer-related fatigue: a randomized-
controlled clinical trial. Sci. Rep. 8:2784. doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-20
993-y
Horing, B., Weimer, K., Muth, E. R., and Enck, P. (2014). Prediction of
placebo responses: a systematic review of the literature. Front. Psychol. 5:1079.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01079
Howe, L. C., Goyer, J. P., and Crum, A. J. (2017). Harnessing the placebo effect:
exploring the influence of physician characteristics on placebo response.Health
Psychol. 36, 1074–1082. doi: 10.1037/hea0000499
Howick, J. (2017). The relativity of ‘placebos’: defending a modified
version of Grünbaum’s definition. Synthese 194, 1363–1396.
doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-1001-0
Hróbjartsson, A., and Gøtzsche, P. C. (2001). Is the placebo powerless? An analysis
of clinical trials comparing placebo with no treatment. N. Engl. J. Med. 344,
1594–1602. doi: 10.1056/NEJM200105243442106
Hróbjartsson, A., and Gøtzsche, P. C. (2004). Is the placebo powerless? Update of
a systematic review with 52 new randomized trials comparing placebo with no
treatment. J. Inter. Med. 25, 91–100. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2796.2004.01355.x
Hutchinson, P., and Moerman, D. E. (2018). The meaning response, “placebo,”
and methods. Perspect. Biol. Med. 61, 361–378. doi: 10.1353/pbm.2018.
0049
Jacobs, K. W., and Nordan, F. M. (1979). Classification of placebo drugs: effect of
color. Percept. Motor Skills 49, 367–372. doi: 10.2466/pms.1979.49.2.367
Jensen, K. B. (2018). What is minimally required to elicit placebo effects? Int. Rev.
Neurobiol. 138, 181–199. doi: 10.1016/bs.irn.2018.01.008
Jensen, K. B., Kaptchuk, T. J., Chen, X., Kirsch, I., Ingvar, M., Gollub,
R. L., et al. (2015). A neural mechanism for nonconscious activation of
conditioned placebo and nocebo responses. Cereb. Cortex 25, 3903–3910.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhu275
Jensen, K. B., Kaptchuk, T. J., Kirsch, I., Raicek, J., Lindstrom, K. M., Berna, C.,
et al. (2012). Nonconscious activation of placebo and nocebo pain responses.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 15959–15964. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1202056109
Johns, R. G., Barkham, M., Kellett, S., and Saxon, D. (2019). A systematic review
of therapist effects: a critical narrative update and refinement to review. Clin.
Psychol. Rev. 67, 78–93. doi: 10.1016/j.cpr.2018.08.004
Jonas, W. B., Crawford, C., Colloca, L., Kaptchuk, T. J., Moseley, B., Miller,
F. G., et al. (2015). To what extent are surgery and invasive procedures
effective beyond a placebo response? A systematic review with meta-
analysis of randomised, sham controlled trials. BMJ Open 5:e009655.
doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2015-009655
Kaptchuk, T. J. (2011). Placebo studies and ritual theory: a comparative analysis of
Navajo, acupuncture and biomedical healing. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci.
366, 1849–1858. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2010.0385
Kaptchuk, T. J. (2018). Open-label placebo: reflections on a research agenda.
Perspect. Biol. Med. 61, 311–334. doi: 10.1353/pbm.2018.0045
Kaptchuk, T. J., Friedlander, E., Kelley, J. M., Sanchez, M. N., Kokkotou,
E., Singer, J. P., et al. (2010). Placebos without deception: a randomized
controlled trial in irritable bowel syndrome. PloS ONE 5:e15591.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015591
Kaptchuk, T. J., Kelley, J. M., Conboy, L. A., Davis, R. B., Kerr, C. E.,
Jacobson, E. E., et al. (2008). Components of placebo effect: randomised
controlled trial in patients with irritable bowel syndrome. BMJ 336, 999–1003.
doi: 10.1136/bmj.39524.439618.25
Kelley, J. M., Lembo, A. J., Ablon, J. S., Villanueva, J. J., Conboy, L.
A., Levy, R., et al. (2009). Patient and practitioner influences on the
placebo effect in irritable bowel syndrome. Psychosom. Med. 71, 789–797.
doi: 10.1097/PSY.0b013e3181acee12
Kelso, J. S. (1995). Dynamic Patterns: The Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kinney, M., Seider, J., Beaty, A. F., Coughlin, K., Dyal, M., and Clewley, D.
(2020). The impact of therapeutic alliance in physical therapy for chronic
musculoskeletal pain: A systematic review of the literature. Physiother. Theory
Pract. 36, 886–898. doi: 10.1080/09593985.2018.1516015
Kirmayer, L. J. (1988). “Mind and body as metaphors: hidden values
in biomedicine,” in Biomedicine Examined (Dordrecht: Springer), 57–93.
doi: 10.1007/978-94-009-2725-4_4
Kirmayer, L. J. (1994). Improvisation and authority in illness meaning. Cult. Med.
Psychiatry 18, 183–214. doi: 10.1007/BF01379449
Kirmayer, L. J. (2003). “Reflections on embodiment,” in Social and Cultural Lives of
Immune Systems, ed J. Wilce (New York, NY: Routledge), 288–309.
Kirmayer, L. J., and Gómez-Carrillo, A. (2019). Agency, embodiment and
enactment in psychosomatic theory and practice. Med. Hum. 45, 169–182.
doi: 10.1136/medhum-2018-011618
Kirsch, I. (1985). Response expectancy as a determinant of experience and
behavior. Am. Psychol. 40, 1189–1202. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.40.11.1189
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 18 June 2021 | Volume 12 | Article 660118
Arandia and Di Paolo Placebo From an Enactive Perspective
Kirsch, I. (1997). “Specifying nonspecifics: Psychological mechanisms of placebo
effects,” in The Placebo Effect: An Interdisciplinary Exploration, ed A.
Harrington (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 166–186.
Kirsch, I. (2018). Response expectancy and the placebo effect. Int. Rev. Neurobiol.
138, 81–93. doi: 10.1016/bs.irn.2018.01.003
Kirsch, I., Wampold, B., and Kelley, J. M. (2016). Controlling for the placebo effect
in psychotherapy: noble quest or tilting at windmills?. Psychol. Consci. Theory
Res. Pract. 3:121. doi: 10.1037/cns0000065
Kleijnen, J., de Craen, A. J., van Everdingen, J., and Krol, L. (1994). Placebo effect
in double-blind clinical trials: a review of interactions with medications. Lancet
344, 1347–1349. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(94)90699-8
Langdridge, D. (2007). Phenomenological Psychology: Theory, Research and
Method. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited.
Legrand, D. (2007). Pre-reflective self-consciousness: on being bodily in the world.
Janus Head 9, 493–519.
Lindsey, E. (1996). Health within illness: experiences of chronically ill/disabled
people. J. Adv. Nurs. 24, 465–472. doi: 10.1046/j.1365-2648.1996.02135.x
Locher, C., Nascimento, A. F., Kirsch, I., Kossowsky, J., Meyer, A., and Gaab,
J. (2017). Is the rationale more important than deception? A randomized
controlled trial of open-label placebo analgesia. Pain 158, 2320–2328.
doi: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000001012
Lucchelli, P. E., Cattaneo, A. D., and Zattoni, J. (1978). Effect of capsule colour and
order of administration of hypnotic treatments. Euro. J. Clin. Pharmacol. 13,
153–155. doi: 10.1007/BF00609760
Luhrmann, T. M. (2013). Making God real and making God good: Some
mechanisms through which prayer may contribute to healing. Transcult.
Psychiatry 50, 707–725. doi: 10.1177/1363461513487670
Lutz, A., and Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology integrating subjective
experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. J. Consci.
Stud. 10, 31–52.
Martin, D. J., Garske, J. P., and Davis, M. K. (2000). Relation of the therapeutic
alliance with outcome and other variables: a meta-analytic review. J. Consult.
Clin. Psychol. 68:438. doi: 10.1037/0022-006X.68.3.438
McGann, M., De Jaegher, H., and Di Paolo, E. (2013). Enaction and psychology.
Rev. Gen. Psychol. 17, 203–209. doi: 10.1037/a0032935
Meissner, K., Fässler, M., Rücker, G., Kleijnen, J., Hróbjartsson, A., Schneider,
A., et al. (2013). Differential effectiveness of placebo treatments: a systematic
review of migraine prophylaxis. JAMA Intern. Med. 173, 1941–1951.
doi: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2013.10391
Mercier, C., Mottron, L., and Belleville, S. (2000). A psychosocial study on
restricted interests in high functioning persons with pervasive developmental
disorders. Autism 4, 406–425. doi: 10.1177/1362361300004004006
Merleau-Ponty,M. (2012). Phenomenology of Perception, ed D. A. Landes (London:
Routledge). doi: 10.4324/9780203720714
Moerman, D. E. (2000). Cultural variations in the placebo effect:
ulcers, anxiety, and blood pressure. Med. Anthropol. Q. 14, 51–72.
doi: 10.1525/maq.2000.14.1.51
Moerman, D. E. (2002). “Explanatory mechanisms for placebo effects: cultural
influences and the meaning response,” in The Science of the Placebo: Toward an
Interdisciplinary Research Agenda, eds H. A. Guess, A. Kleinman, J. W. Kusek,
and L. W. Engel (London: BMJ Books), 77–107.
Moerman, D. E. (2013). Against the “placebo effect”: a personal point of view.
Complem. Ther. Med. 21, 125–130. doi: 10.1016/j.ctim.2013.01.005
Moerman, D. E., and Jonas, W. B. (2002). Deconstructing the placebo
effect and finding the meaning response. Ann. Inter. Med. 136, 471–476.
doi: 10.7326/0003-4819-136-6-200203190-00011
Mol, A. (2002). Cutting surgeons, walking patients: some complexities
involved in comparing. Complex. Soc. Stud. Know. Pract. 218–257.
doi: 10.1215/9780822383550-009
Montgomery, G. H., and Kirsch, I. (1997). Classical conditioning and the placebo
effect. Pain 72, 107–113. doi: 10.1016/S0304-3959(97)00016-X
Myers, W. B. (2010). The placebo as performance: speaking across domains of
healing. Quali. Health Res. 20, 1295–1303. doi: 10.1177/1049732310370966
Newen, A., De Bruin, L., and Gallagher, S. (eds.). (2018). The Oxford
Handbook of 4E Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.001.0001
O’Leary, A. (1985). Self-efficacy and health. Behav. Res. Ther. 23, 437–451.
doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(85)90172-X
Ongaro, G., and Kaptchuk, T. J. (2019). Symptom perception, placebo effects, and
the bayesian brain. Pain 160:1. doi: 10.1097/j.pain.0000000000001367
Ongaro, G., and Ward, D. (2017). An enactive account of placebo effects. Biol.
Philos. 32, 507–533. doi: 10.1007/s10539-017-9572-4
Pacheco-López, G., Engler, H., Niemi, M. B., and Schedlowski, M. (2006).
Expectations and associations that heal: immunomodulatory placebo
effects and its neurobiology. Brain Behav. Immun. 20, 430–446.
doi: 10.1016/j.bbi.2006.05.003
Paterson, C., and Dieppe, P. (2005). Characteristic and incidental (placebo)
effects in complex interventions such as acupuncture. BMJ 330, 1202–1205.
doi: 10.1136/bmj.330.7501.1202
Peper, E., andHarvey, R. (2017). The fallacy of the placebo-controlled clinical trials:
are positive outcomes the result of ‘indirect’ treatment effects?NeuroRegulation
4, 102–102. doi: 10.15540/nr.4.3-4.102
Pessoa, L. (2013). The Cognitive-Emotional Brain: From Interactions to Integration.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019569.001.0001
Petrovic, P., Dietrich, T., Fransson, P., Andersson, J., Carlsson, K., and Ingvar,
M. (2005). Placebo in emotional processing—induced expectations of anxiety
relief activate a generalized modulatory network. Neuron 46, 957–969.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2005.05.023
Phillips, D. P., Ruth, T. E., and Wagner, L. M. (1993). Psychology and survival.
Lancet 342, 1142–1145. doi: 10.1016/0140-6736(93)92124-C
Price, D. D., Finniss, D. G., and Benedetti, F. (2008). A comprehensive review of
the placebo effect: recent advances and current thought. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59,
565–590. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.59.113006.095941
Raja, V. (2018). A theory of resonance: towards an ecological cognitive
architecture.Minds Mach. 28, 29–51. doi: 10.1007/s11023-017-9431-8
Ramírez-Vizcaya, S., and Froese, T. (2019). The enactive approach to habits: new
concepts for the cognitive science of bad habits and addiction. Front. Psychol.
10:301. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00301
Ransom, M., Fazelpour, S., Markovic, J., Kryklywy, J., Thompson, E. T., and Todd,
R. M. (2020). Affect-biased attention and predictive processing. Cognition
203:104370. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104370
Rheims, S., Cucherat, M., Arzimanoglou, A., and Ryvlin, P. (2008). Greater
response to placebo in children than in adults: a systematic review
and meta-analysis in drug-resistant partial epilepsy. PLoS Med. 5:e166.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0050166
Schenk, L. A., Sprenger, C., Onat, S., Colloca, L., and Büchel, C. (2017). Suppression
of striatal prediction errors by the prefrontal cortex in placebo hypoalgesia. J.
Neurosci. 37, 9715–9723. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1101-17.2017
Schrader, H., Bovim, G., Sand, T., Obelieniene, D., Siurkiene, D.,
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